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ABSTRACT
Two philosophy students, M and V, discuss the ethics of meat con-
sumption. Standard arguments on both sides are reviewed, with em-
phasis on the argument that meat-consumption is wrong because it 
supports extreme cruelty. M and V also address such questions as 
how conflicting intuitions ought to be weighed, whether meat-eating 
is comparable to participating in a holocaust, why ethical arguments 
often fail to change our behavior even when they change our beliefs, 
and how an ethical vegetarian morally ought to interact with non-
vegetarians.
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The ethical case for vegetarianism has been laid out in 
many articles and books by prominent philosophers in the last 
few decades.1 This case is by now familiar to most philoso-
phers, many of whom regard the wrongness of current meat 
consumption practices as being conclusively established. Yet 
ethical vegetarianism remains a fringe position in most modern 
societies, and most non-philosophers remain unfamiliar with 
the arguments. This work is intended to bring the arguments 
to a larger audience, including both students and curious lay 
people, through a more accessible literary form than the stan-
dard academic paper: the form of an argumentative dialogue 
between two fictional characters, M (a meat-eater) and V (an 
ethical vegetarian). After reviewing the standard arguments, 
M and V reflect on such matters as why radical animal welfare 
positions “sound crazy” to most listeners, why persuasive ethi-
cal arguments often fail to motivate behavioral changes, and 
how a vegetarian morally ought to interact with meat eaters.
1  See, e.g., Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of 
the Animal Movement, reissue edition (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); 
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Calif.: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2004); Alastair Norcross, “Puppies, Pigs, and 
People,” Philosophical Perspectives 18, Ethics (2004): 229-45, available 
at http://faculty.smu.edu/jkazez/animal%20rights/norcross-4.pdf; Mylan 
Engel, “The Commonsense Case for Ethical Vegetarianism,” Between the 
Species 19 (2016): 2-31, available at http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
vol19/iss1/1/; Stuart Rachels, “Vegetarianism,” pp. 877-905 in The Oxford 
Handbook of Animal Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), avail-
able at www.jamesrachels.org/stuart/veg.pdf.
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Day 1: Suffering, intelligence, and the risk 
argument
Setting: Two philosophy students, M and V, have met for lunch 
at their local Native Foods Cafe.
M: Hey, V. I’ve never been to this restaurant before. Looks nice.
V: Yeah, I come here a lot. It’s one of the few vegetarian res-
taurants in town. 
M (disappointed): Oh.
V: Oh, what? 
M: Nothing . . . So we’re going to be eating sticks and leaves 
then.
V: No, no. I think you’ll be surprised at how good the food is 
here.
M (skeptical): If you say so. 
M and V order and then sit down at a table in the corner.
M: So . . . you’re a vegetarian.
V: Yep. Been vegetarian for the last three years.
M: Wow. I didn’t know you were such a crazy extremist.
V: (laughs) Some people would say that. I think it’s just the 
reasonable position.
M: Did you know that Adolf Hitler was a vegetarian?
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V: (sigh) Godwin’s law already?2 Yes, I know. Gandhi was also 
a vegetarian.
M: Well, I guess you can find both good and evil people who 
have done most things. So what made you give up meat?
V: I figured out that meat-eating is morally wrong.
M: So if you were stranded on a lifeboat, about to die of starva-
tion, and there was nothing to eat except a chicken, would you 
eat it?
V: Of course.
M: Aha! So you don’t really think meat-eating is wrong.
V: When I say something is wrong, I don’t mean it’s wrong in 
every conceivable circumstance. After all, just about anything 
is okay in some possible circumstance. I just mean that it is 
wrong in the typical circumstances we are actually in.3 I don’t 
care about hypothetical possibilities.
M: So you think it’s wrong to eat meat in the circumstances we 
normally actually face.
V: Right.
M and V’s food arrives, and they start in on two appetizing 
vegan meals.
2  Godwin’s law: As an internet discussion grows longer, the probability 
of a comparison involving Hitler approaches 1. Also applies to some non-
internet discussions.
3  Compare Engel, “Commonsense Case,” pp. 6-7.
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M: Okay, you’re right: this is better than I thought it would be. 
I could enjoy coming here once in a while for something dif-
ferent. But it still seems to me like this ethical vegetarianism of 
yours is an extreme view.
V: I don’t think it’s that extreme. Would you agree that pain and 
suffering are bad?
M: No, I think pain is necessary. You know, there is a rare 
medical condition in which people are unable to feel pain.4 As a 
result, they don’t notice when they injure themselves, so they’re 
in danger of bleeding out, injuring themselves further, and so 
on. It’s really quite bad. So you see, pain is actually good.
V: Sounds like you’re just saying that given certain conditions, 
pain can be instrumentally good. You don’t think it’s intrinsi-
cally good, do you?
M: What do you mean by that?
V: Well, you’re just saying pain can sometimes have good ef-
fects. You’re not saying it’s good in itself, are you? I mean, say 
you have to have a tooth drilled at the dentist’s office. Do you 
take the anesthetic?
M: Of course. I don’t want gratuitous pain. I only want pain 
when it helps me avoid injuring myself, helps me learn valuable 
lessons, or something like that.
V: Agreed. And the same is true about suffering, right?
M: What’s the difference between “pain” and “suffering”?
4  Congenital analgesia.
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V: “Suffering” is broader. Suffering would include things like 
the experience of being confined in a tiny cell so that you can 
barely move for a prolonged period of time. That might not ex-
actly be painful, but it’s certainly a negative experience.
M: Of course, negative experiences are bad, provided that they 
don’t produce some benefit, like teaching you valuable lessons 
or enabling you to avoid injury.
V: Yes, let’s take that as understood. Now, if suffering is bad, 
in the sense we’ve just described, then I suppose that larger 
amounts of suffering are worse? Like, if you have intense suf-
fering, for a long period, that’s worse than a milder, shorter 
suffering. Right?
M: Other things being equal, sure.
V: Okay. It also seems to me that it’s wrong to cause a very 
large amount of something bad, for the sake of some minor 
good. Would you agree with that?
M: That sounds generally right, but I’m not sure that’s always 
true . . . What if I make a great sacrifice of my own welfare, to 
achieve a small benefit for my kids? That wouldn’t be wrong; 
that would be noble. Perhaps foolish, but noble anyway.
V: Okay, I overgeneralized. Let’s be more specific. I think it’s 
wrong to knowingly inflict a great deal of pain and suffering on 
others, just for the sake of getting relatively minor benefits for 
yourself. That’s not some crazy extremist view, is it?
M: (laughs) No, it’s not.
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V: Okay, well, the meat industry inflicts a great deal of pain 
and suffering on animals, for the sake of comparatively minor 
benefits. It follows that the meat industry is doing something 
wrong.
M: What pain and suffering are you talking about?
V: For instance, chickens and pigs are commonly confined in 
tiny cages where they can’t move for their entire lives. Cows 
are branded with hot irons, to produce third degree burns on 
their skin. People cut off pigs’ tails without anesthetic. They 
cut off the ends of chickens’ beaks, again without anesthetic. 
These tails and beaks are sensitive tissue, so it probably feels 
something like having a finger chopped off.5
M: Okay, that’s enough. I don’t want to hear any more.
V: Why not?
M: It’s unpleasant, and I’m trying to eat.
V: But you don’t have any problem with eating the products 
that come from these practices?
M: As long as I don’t have to think about it or watch it, I’m 
okay with it.
V: Isn’t that a little hypocritical? If you feel disgusted or horri-
fied by the practices on factory farms, doesn’t that suggest that 
you shouldn’t buy their products either?
5  For more on these and many other forms of cruelty, see Rachels, “Veg-
etarianism,” section 1.
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M: Not at all. There are lots of things that I wouldn’t want to 
look at that are perfectly good and valuable services. For in-
stance, I wouldn’t want to watch someone performing surgery, 
because I can’t stand the sight of blood. But that doesn’t mean 
I think surgery is wrong.
V: So the negative reaction you have to animal cruelty is like 
the negative reaction you have to watching a surgery.
M: Exactly. 
V: So it’s not because it makes you feel guilty, or because it 
seems wrong when you see it?
M: Nope. It’s just unpleasant to look at, but it’s necessary to 
produce a greater good. The good of human gustatory pleasure.
V: But didn’t we agree that it’s wrong to inflict great pain and 
suffering on others, for the sake of relatively minor benefits?
M: Oh, when I agreed that it was wrong to inflict gratuitous 
pain and suffering, I thought we were talking about humans. 
Of course it’s wrong to inflict gratuitous suffering on other hu-
mans. But animals are another matter entirely.
V: Why are they another matter?
M: Oh, that’s easy. You see, humans have intelligence, and 
nonhuman animals don’t.
V: Do you mean that all animals have zero intelligence?
M: Well, they have drastically lower intelligence than humans.
V: I see.
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M: Drastically.
V: And you believe it’s morally okay to inflict severe pain on 
those who are much less intelligent, for the sake of small ben-
efits to those who are more intelligent?
M: Right.
V: And why do you think that?
M: It seems right to me.
V: That isn’t obvious to me. Do you have any further reason to 
give? Something that might make it seem right to me too?
M: Nope. It’s just an intuition. It’s like “1+1=2” and “The short-
est path between two points is a straight line.” You know, self-
evident.6
V: And you don’t have any explanation for why it would be true 
either? Why intelligence gives one the right to torture the less 
intelligent?
M: No explanation. It’s just a brute fact.
6  Here, M follows the views of Bryan Caplan, “Reply to Huemer on Ethi-
cal Treatment of Animals (including Bugs),” Econlog, Oct. 11, 2016, http://
econlog.econlib.org/archives/2016/10/reply_to_huemer.html; “Further 
Reply to Huemer on the Ethical Treatment of Animals,” Econlog, Oct. 14, 
2016, http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2016/10/further_reply_t_1.html; 
and Richard Posner, “Animal Rights” (debate between Peter Singer & Rich-
ard Posner), Slate, June 2001, available at https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/
interviews-debates/200106--.htm).
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V: I hear that Albert Einstein was really smart. Much smarter 
than the rest of us, in fact.
M: Yeah, so?
V: So I’m just wondering if that means he would have been jus-
tified in torturing us, if he could have gotten some minor ben-
efit by doing so. You know, because he was so much smarter 
than us.
M: No, he wasn’t sufficiently smarter than us. The gap between 
animals and the average human is much bigger than the gap 
between an average human and Einstein.
V: Superintelligent aliens, then.
M: What?
V: Say a race of superintelligent aliens lands on Earth. They’re 
way smarter than any human. So can they eat us, torture us for 
fun, and so on?
M: That doesn’t seem right. I’m going to say that there’s a 
threshold level of intelligence that you have to have. If you’re 
above the threshold, then no one gets to torture you. If you’re 
below it – open season.
V: And what is this threshold?
M: What, you mean like, the actual IQ number?
V: Yeah.
M: Geez, I don’t know.
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V: Then how can you know that humans are above the thresh-
old and animals are below?
M: Well, I don’t know the exact number. But I know that it’s 
pretty high. I know it’s higher than the level of an animal.
V: You mean it’s higher than the intelligence level of even the 
smartest animal in the world? Higher than that chimp that 
learned sign language, or the octopus in New Zealand that es-
caped from his aquarium recently, or the three dolphins that 
rescued a woman at sea in 1971 . . . ?7 
M: Oh, I’m not saying that. I’m just saying the threshold for 
having moral status is above the intelligence level of cows, 
chickens, or pigs. Or any other animal that I like to eat.
V: I see. And how do we know that? Assuming there is such a 
threshold, how do you know that the threshold isn’t lower?
M: Again, intuition.
V: Are you sure you’re not just saying what is convenient for 
you, and declaring that to be intuitive?
M: Yep, I’m sure.
7  For more, see the following: On Washoe the chimp: the “Friends of 
Washoe” web site, http://www.friendsofwashoe.org/meet/washoe.html; 
on Inky the octopus: Wajeeha Malik, “Inky’s Daring Escape Shows How 
Smart Octopuses Are,” National Geographic, April 14, 2016, https://
news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/04/160414-inky-octopus-escapes-
intelligence/; on the dolphin rescuers: Annie B. Bond, “3 Stories of Dolphin 
Saviors,” Care2, August 25, 2008, http://www.care2.com/greenliving/3-
stories-of-dolphin-saviors.html.
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V: You didn’t think about that very long.
M: Sorry, I’m being too cavalier. Let me think about it. (pauses 
for three seconds, furrows brow) Okay, I just introspected very 
carefully, and I assure you that I’m not being at all influenced 
by self-interest. I just have a purely intellectual intuition that 
none of the animals whose flesh I like to eat have any moral 
status.
V: This isn’t obvious to me.
M: I guess you’re not as morally sensitive as the rest of us are. 
Don’t feel bad. We won’t force you to eat meat if you don’t 
want to.
V: Just to clarify, are you saying that because animals have low 
intelligence, their pain isn’t bad? Or are you saying that even 
though their pain is bad, it’s still okay to cause a lot of badness 
for the sake of a trivial benefit?
M: I guess I’m saying the first thing.
V: Their pain isn’t bad at all?
M: Well, it’s much less bad than human pain.
V: How much less? Like half as bad maybe?
M: Oh no, it’s at least a thousand times less bad.
V: So the interests of smart humans matter a thousand times 
more than the interests of stupid animals?
M: Right.
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V: I see. Well, even if that’s true, factory farming is still wrong.
M: Why do you say that?
V: Because the harm we’re causing to the animals is more than 
a thousand times greater than the benefit we get.
M: Whoa, how do you figure that?
V: It’s the sheer numbers. Humans slaughter about 74 billion 
animals per year, worldwide.8 And that’s just land animals; the 
numbers of marine animals are much larger.
M: Wow, 74 billion. Well, there are seven and a half billion 
people to feed.
V: Yes. So the number of animals killed for food in one year is 
nearly 10 times the entire human population of the world.
M: So the average person on Earth eats about 10 complete land 
animals per year . . . Actually, that number sounds low.
V: It’s higher in rich countries. For Americans, the number is 
31.9
M: Okay, that sounds like a lot. But that’s just the number of 
killings. You were complaining about all this pain and suffer-
ing. That doesn’t tell us how much suffering occurs.
8  U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, “FAOSTAT,” 2018, http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL, accessed Sept. 5, 2018.
9  Ryan Geiss, “How Many Animals Do We Eat?”, http://www.geisswerks.
com/about_animals.html, accessed Nov. 22, 2017.
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V: Right, we don’t have statistics on the quantity of suffering, 
since there’s no established way of measuring suffering. But al-
most all of the 74 billion land animals were on factory farms,10 
where the practices are – well, that stuff that you didn’t want 
me to talk about while you’re eating. If you imagine the life of 
a factory farm animal, it seems worse than the life of almost 
any human. Unless you live in a torture chamber or something.
M: You’re making this sound kind of bad.
V: If animal interests and human interests were equally impor-
tant, then it would be like having 74 billion people tortured and 
killed each year.
M: Well, that’s ridiculous. Obviously, human and animal inter-
ests aren’t equally important.
V: Are you sure of that? Some respected ethicists think they 
are.11
M: Well, my intuitions are better than theirs. They’re probably 
just soft-hearted animal-lovers who are biased because of their 
love for animals.12
10  Nil Zacharias, “It’s Time to End Factory Farming,” Huffington Post, 
10/19/2011, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nil-zacharias/its-time-to-end-
factory-f_b_1018840.html.
11  See Peter Singer, “Equality for Animals?” in Practical Ethics (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 55-82, available at https://
www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1979----.htm.
12  Loren Lomasky entertains similar thoughts in “Is It Wrong to Eat Ani-
mals?”, Social Philosophy & Policy 30 (2013): 177-200, at p. 186.
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V: They might say that you’re biased because of your self-in-
terest.
M: Yeah, but I already refuted that, remember? I introspected, 
and I could tell that I wasn’t biased. So it’s got to be the animal-
welfare people who are biased.
V: I remember. So, as you were saying, animal interests are 
only one thousandth as important as human interests?
M: That’s right.
V: Okay, so it’s really only one thousandth as bad as torturing 
and killing 74 billion people a year? So then the meat industry 
is only as bad as having 74 million people tortured and killed 
per year?
M: Wait, did I say a thousand? I meant a million. Human inter-
ests are a million times more important than animal interests.13
V: Where did you get the “one million” figure from?
M: Intuition. I just thought about it, and it seemed obvious.
V: Are you sure you’re not just picking numbers for conve-
nience? Like, just saying whatever is required to justify your 
current practices?
M: Yep. Wait. (pauses for three seconds) Okay, I thought about 
it. I didn’t notice any bias on my part.
13  Compare Caplan, “Further Reply.”
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V: Let me try a thought experiment on you. Two people have 
headaches, both equally severe. Assume there are no relevant 
effects of these headaches beyond the pain. You have one pain 
reliever that you can give to one of them. You can’t split it.
M: Sounds like I should flip a coin.
V: Wait, there’s more. One of the people is smarter than the 
other. He scored higher on the SAT, he’s better at solving dif-
ferential equations, he has a bigger vocabulary. True or false: 
you’d better give the aspirin to the smarter person, because his 
pain is worse, because he’s smart?14
M: I don’t see the point of this thought experiment.
V: I’m just trying to determine whether it’s really intuitively 
obvious that one’s intelligence affects how bad one’s pain is.
M: Of course, in that case it doesn’t. Remember, there is a cru-
cial threshold level of intelligence. If you’re below the thresh-
old, then your suffering doesn’t matter, or only barely matters. 
When you cross the threshold, your suffering suddenly matters 
a million times more, even for qualitatively indistinguishable 
suffering. But after you pass the threshold, no further increases 
in intelligence make any difference at all; then everyone mat-
ters equally.
V: All this sounds arbitrary. Why would all that be true?
M: No explanation is needed. These are just fundamental facts 
about the moral landscape.
14  I owe this example to David Barnett.
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V: And it happens that all humans are above the threshold, so 
all humans are equal?
M: Yes.
V: So let’s say you saw a couple of boys pour gasoline on a cat, 
then light the cat on fire, just for the fun of watching it writhe 
in agony.15 They laugh, showing that they got some enjoyment 
out of it. To you, this seems perfectly alright?
M: No, sadistic pleasure is always bad.
V: If animal suffering doesn’t matter, then what’s wrong with 
taking pleasure in it? Isn’t it just like taking pleasure in any 
morally neutral thing, like watching the grass grow?
M: No, animal suffering is just a tiny bit bad. That’s enough to 
make it wrong to take pleasure in it.
V: What if the boys had some other, minor reason for doing 
it? Like they want to explore a cave, and they need a torch to 
see by. Burning the cat is slightly more convenient than find-
ing some non-sentient thing to burn. So then it’d be perfectly 
alright to burn the cat alive?
M: That does seem kind of messed up. 
V: How are cats different from cows?
15  Gilbert Harman gives this as an example of seeing wrongness in The 
Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1977), pp. 4-5, 7-8.
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M: Well, food is a more important purpose than having a torch 
for cave-exploring.
V: So the boys can burn the cat to later eat it, but not to light 
the cave?
M: I don’t know, still seems messed up. Maybe I’m just biased 
in favor of cats because people in our society use them as pets. 
Maybe it is really okay to burn the cat.
V: What about mentally disabled people? I once met a person 
who was so severely mentally retarded that she couldn’t talk.16 
Would it have been okay for me to torture her, if it would have 
given me some minor benefit?
M: No, that would have upset her family.
V: So it’s wrong to inflict great pain on an unintelligent being, 
if doing so upsets some intelligent beings?
M: That’s right.
V: Well, factory farming really upsets me. Why doesn’t that 
make it wrong?
M: Because the animals aren’t yours. They belong to the farm-
ers. So it doesn’t matter if you’re upset. You can’t hurt the men-
tally disabled person, because she belongs to her family, and 
they would be upset.
16  Profoundly retarded human beings may have difficulty, not only 
talking, but even eating or moving about on their own. See Traci Peder-
sen, “Profound Mental Retardation,” Psych Central, April 13, 2016, http://
psychcentral.com/encyclopedia/profound-mental-retardation-2.
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V: So only the family would be allowed to torture the mentally 
disabled person.
M: No, they can’t do it either.
V: Why not? On your view, isn’t that just like farm owners 
torturing their animals?
M: Yeah . . . but the mentally disabled person is a human. The 
animals aren’t.
V: But we’re trying to figure out what’s so special about hu-
mans. You told me it was intelligence. So if we find a human 
who lacks intelligence, then it follows that that human isn’t spe-
cial. Right?
M: Well . . . they still belong to the same species as us.17 You 
see, when you want to figure out how bad someone’s pain is, 
you don’t look at their own intelligence level. You have to look 
at the average intelligence of the species that they belong to. 
If that average is above the threshold, then their pain is really 
bad. If it’s below the threshold, then their pain barely matters.
V: I don’t see why the badness of my pain would depend on the 
intelligence of other people.
M: Again, this is just a basic ethical axiom. I’m sorry you have 
trouble apprehending all of these basic axioms.
17  Here, M follows the position taken by Carl Cohen in “A Critique of the 
Alleged Moral Basis for Vegetarianism” in Food for Thought: The Debate 
over Eating Meat, ed. Steve Sapontzis (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 2004), 
pp. 152-66, at p. 162; and by Posner in his debate with Singer (op. cit.).
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V: So what if, in the future, a whole bunch of profoundly men-
tally disabled people were born? So many that it lowered the 
average intelligence of the human species to below this intel-
ligence threshold that you keep talking about. Then, on your 
view, it would become okay to torture me? Because I would 
then belong to a species with a low average IQ?
M: No. You see, there are actually two principles. One, that it’s 
wrong to torture beings who have a high enough IQ. Two, it’s 
wrong to torture beings who belong to a species whose average 
IQ is high enough. But it’s okay to torture beings whose IQ is 
below the threshold and belong to a species whose average is 
also below that threshold. That’s the moral principle.
V: And you’re sure all this is correct?
M: Totally.
V: Even though you can’t explain why these things would be 
true?
M: It’s enough that it’s obvious to me.
V: Even though it’s not obvious to me.
M: You’re biased.
V: Okay. How certain are you of all this?
M: A hundred percent.
V: I don’t think you can be a hundred percent certain.
M: Why not?
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V: A hundred percent certainty means that it’s the most certain 
thing possible. So nothing else could ever be more certain than 
these controversial ethical claims you’ve made. Suppose that 
God came down from Heaven and told us that one of the fol-
lowing things is the case: either you’re mistaken about animal 
ethics, or you’re mistaken in thinking there’s a table in front 
of you now. (knocks on the table that M and V are sitting at) 
Which would you think is more likely?
M: Okay, I’m more sure of the table.
V: So your ethical claims aren’t completely certain.
M: Fine. They’re only ninety-nine percent certain.
V: So there’s a one percent chance that the animal welfare ad-
vocates might be right.
M: Yeah, only 1%.
V: Well, that’s enough to make meat eating wrong. If there’s a 
1% chance that, say, Peter Singer’s views of animal ethics are 
correct, then you’re morally obligated to give up meat.
M: How can that be?
V: It’s a matter of the ethics of risk. We agree that it’s wrong to 
perform an action that has extremely bad effects on others, for 
the sake of minor benefits.
M: Sure.
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V: But it needn’t be certain that your action will have bad ef-
fects. An action could be wrong just because it might have very 
bad effects.
M: But we accept risks all the time. I mean, when I drive my 
car, there’s always a chance that I’ll cause an accident and in-
jure someone. But it’s not wrong to drive the car.
V: But it is wrong to drive drunk, right?
M: Yeah.
V: Because that creates too high of a risk.
M: Yeah. I just don’t think the “risk” that we’re wronging ani-
mals is that high.
V: Would you agree that the acceptable level of risk a person 
may undertake depends on how bad the bad outcome would 
be?
M: What do you mean?
V: Say I want to keep a nuclear bomb in my basement. Every 
day that I keep the bomb there, let’s say, there is a tiny chance 
that something will accidentally set off the bomb. This chance 
is much lower than the probability that I will kill someone in a 
traffic accident while driving my car. And yet, it’s okay for me 
to drive the car, but it’s not okay to keep the nuclear bomb in 
my basement.
M: I agree. No one should have personal nuclear bombs.
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V: And that’s because the harm of a nuclear bomb accident is 
much greater than the harm of a traffic accident. If I have a car 
accident, I might kill someone. But if I accidentally set off the 
bomb, it’ll destroy the entire city. So the acceptable risk level is 
much lower in the case of the nuke.
M: Sounds reasonable. I would add also that you have good 
reasons for wanting to drive – like, you need to get to work. But 
I don’t think you have very good reasons for wanting to have 
the nuclear bomb.
V: Agreed. So whether it’s okay to do something that might 
produce a bad effect depends upon (i) how bad the effect would 
be, (ii) how likely it is that the bad effect would occur, and (iii) 
how strong of a reason you have for doing the thing.
M: Sounds right.
V: Now, if Peter Singer is right, then the meat industry is about 
as bad as a practice that tortured 74 billion people a year would 
be. If there were such a practice, it would be incredibly bad.
M: Good thing Peter Singer isn’t right.
V: But if there is a 1% chance that he’s right, then the meat in-
dustry is about as wrong as a practice that has a 1% chance of 
torturing 74 billion people a year. Which is about as wrong as 
a practice that definitely tortures and kills 740 million people 
a year.
M: That sounds crazy. 740 million?
V: That’s 1% times 74 billion. A thing with a 1% chance of do-
ing the equivalent of harming 74 billion people in some way is 
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1% as bad as a thing that harms 74 billion people in that way. 
Which means it is as bad as harming 740 million people.
M: But it’s 99% likely that such an action wouldn’t harm any-
one – then it would be as bad as an action that harms zero 
people.
V: Sorry, let me rephrase. You have reason to avoid actions 
that, from your point of view, might cause something bad. The 
strength of this reason is proportional to (i) the probability that 
the action will cause something bad, and (ii) the magnitude of 
the bad outcome that might occur. So, if there is a 1% chance 
that Peter Singer is right, then the reason we have for abolish-
ing the meat industry is about as strong as the reason that we 
would have for abolishing a practice that tortured 740 million 
people a year.
M: What if I say there’s no chance that Singer is right?
V: If God came down and told you that either Singer is right or 
this table doesn’t exist . . .
M: Okay fine, there’s some chance that Singer is right. But it’s 
less than 1%.
V: How low? One in a thousand? Then our reason for abolish-
ing factory farming is “only” as strong as the reason we would 
have to abolish a practice that torture-killed 74 million people 
a year.
M: Well, maybe it’s less than that. Maybe there’s only a one in 
a million chance that he’s right.
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V: Do you really think so? Singer thinks that the badness of 
a painful experience is just a matter of how painful it is. This 
doesn’t strike me as absurd. Your defense of meat-eating, on 
the other hand, requires us to accept all of the following:
1. The badness of a pain depends on intelligence, 
rather than just depending on what the pain feels 
like.
2. There is a threshold IQ at which the badness of 
pain suddenly goes up, rather than its increasing 
gradually with IQ.
3. It goes up by something like a factor of a million, 
rather than, say, only two or ten or a hundred.
4. After that, the badness of pain levels off, rather 
than continuing to increase.
5. The threshold is safely above that of any animals 
that are commonly used for food, but below the 
level of normal humans.
6. Sometimes, the badness of one’s pain depends on 
the mean intelligence of the species to which one 
belongs, rather than just depending on one’s own 
intelligence. But
7. It’s not just the intelligence of the species that mat-
ters; rather, it’s the larger of the individual’s IQ and 
the average IQ of his species, that determines how 
bad the individual’s pain is.
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You don’t have any explanation for why any of these things 
would be true, nor any argument that they are true, apart from 
the need to say these things to defend our current practices. 
You say they’re grounded in intuition, yet all of them strike 
me as arbitrary at best, not intuitive at all. It’s hard for me to 
see how all of this leaves us with a 99.9999% probability that 
you’re right and Singer is wrong.
M: You’re giving me a hard time. But let me ask you this: if 
you had to kill either a pig or a person, would you really just 
flip a coin?
V: Why can’t I just not kill anyone?
M: You’re driving, your brakes have failed, and you’re going to 
run over a kid, unless you swerve aside and hit a pig.
V: Hit the pig.
M: What if it was ten pigs?
V: Still hit the pigs.
M: What about a hundred pigs?
V: I don’t know. Where are you going with this?
M: Well, at last you’ve admitted that humans are more impor-
tant than animals!
V: You mean that human lives are more valuable than animal 
lives.
M: Isn’t that what I said?
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V: I was just clarifying. How does this make it okay to torture 
animals?
M: Human pleasure or pain matters more than animal pleasure 
or pain. You just admitted it.
V: No, I don’t agree with that. I think that what’s bad about pain 
is what it feels like. Therefore, how bad a painful experience 
is is just a matter of how bad it feels. It doesn’t depend on how 
big your vocabulary is, or how fast you can solve equations, or 
anything else that doesn’t have to do with how it feels.
M: But then how can you explain that human lives are more 
valuable than animal lives?
V: I think there are both simple values and complex values. The 
simple goods and bads in life are pleasure and pain, or enjoy-
ment and suffering. All sentient beings have these, including 
humans and pigs.
M: Right. But we have a lot more to our lives besides that. Hu-
mans can experience moral virtue, understanding of important 
abstract truths, friendship, great achievements, and so on.
V: Agreed. That’s why typical human lives are more valuable 
than typical animal lives.
M: I’m glad we agree on that. So that’s why it’s okay for us to 
eat them!
V: Whoa, no way. That doesn’t follow at all.
M: Why not?
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V: Because none of those sophisticated goods are at stake here. 
It’s not like you have to buy meat from factory farms in order to 
survive – then I would be in agreement with you. In fact, many 
experts think that a vegetarian diet is more healthy than a meat-
containing diet.18 And you don’t have to eat meat to attain any 
of those complex, sophisticated goods, either. You don’t have to 
do it to attain moral virtue, or understanding, or friendship, or 
any great achievement. You’re just doing it for pleasure.
M: But human pleasure is more important than animal pleasure 
or pain!
V: I don’t see why.
M: Because humans are capable of more sophisticated kinds 
of pleasure than animals are. It’s for the same reason that we 
are capable of those complex goods that you were just talking 
about that animals can’t have.
V: Sure, maybe we have some more sophisticated kinds of 
pleasure. But that’s irrelevant, because none of them are what 
we’re talking about. We’re talking about the pleasure of tasting 
animal flesh. That pleasure doesn’t outweigh the suffering of 
the animal on the factory farm. Our ability to have some other 
kinds of pleasures isn’t relevant to that.
M: You’re messing with my brain, V. I need to go home and 
rest it.
M and V, having finished their meal, start clearing their places.
18  For a review of the evidence, see Engel, “Commonsense Case,” pp. 
12-17.
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V: Okay. Are we still on for next week?
M: Sure, I’ll talk to you then.
V: Same place, same time?
M: After everything you’ve said, I guess I won’t offer to take 
you out to a burger joint. Okay, we can meet here again.
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Day 2: Other defenses of meat consumption
Setting: M and V have met at Native Foods for another deli-
cious vegan meal.
V: Have you thought more about what we discussed last week, 
M?
M: Yeah. Let me see if I understand what you’re saying.
V: Go ahead.
M: So, factory farming inflicts extreme pain and suffering on 
74 billion animals a year, before killing them. Peter Singer 
thinks animal suffering is equally important as human suffer-
ing. If he’s right, then factory farming is like an institution that 
tortures 74 billion people a year. If there’s even a 1% chance 
that he’s right, then it’s like an institution that tortures 740 mil-
lion people a year. Or if animal suffering is even 1% as impor-
tant as human suffering, then again factory farming is like an 
institution that tortures 740 million people a year.
V: Right. And if there’s only a 1% chance that animal suffer-
ing is 1% as important as human suffering, then it’s “only” 
comparable to a practice that tortures 7.4 million people a year, 
which would still be horrific. And since there aren’t even any 
good arguments that animal interests matter drastically less 
than human interests, it’s hard to claim that there’s not even a 
1% chance that animal interests are even 1% as important as 
human interests.
M: My argument was that humans are smarter than animals, 
and that pain matters much less for a less intelligent creature.
Michael Huemer
51
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
V: But you couldn’t give any argument for this or any expla-
nation of why it would be true. Which makes it hard to claim 
certainty that you’re right.
M: (sigh) Okay. Let’s say factory farming is wrong.
V: So you agree that it should be abolished?
M: I guess so. But that doesn’t mean that eating meat is wrong.
V: Why not?
M: Well, meat could be produced humanely, without all this 
cruelty.19 Therefore, in principle, there could be a meat industry 
that was morally okay, in which case it would be okay to eat the 
meat it produced.
V: But remember what the issue was. When I told you that I 
think meat-eating is wrong, I explained that I mean that it is 
wrong in the conditions we normally actually find ourselves in. 
It doesn’t matter if there is some hypothetical possible world in 
which it would be okay.
M: Oh yeah. But just because factory farming is wrong, doesn’t 
mean that I’m wrong for buying meat.
V: You know that almost all meat is from factory farms, right?20
19  Compare Lomasky’s comments on veal and foie gras (“Is It Wrong to 
Eat Animals?”, p. 195).
20  From Zacharias, “It’s Time to End Factory Farming”: “[F]actory farms 
raise 99.9 percent of chickens for meat, 97 percent of laying hens, 99 percent 
of turkeys, 95 percent of pigs, and 78 percent of cattle currently sold in the 
United States.”
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M: Yeah, I know. But it’s not my fault that they’re so cruel and 
inhumane. It’s not like I’m inflicting the pain and suffering on 
the animals directly. It’s the workers on the farms. I don’t see 
why I should be blamed for their bad behavior.
V: Because you’re paying them for what they’re doing.
M: So what?
V: Usually, if it’s wrong to do something, then it’s also wrong 
to pay other people to do it. For instance, murder is wrong; so 
it’s also wrong to hire an assassin. If you hire an assassin to kill 
someone, you can’t say that you’re not to blame just because 
you didn’t pull the trigger yourself.
M: Yeah, but that’s different. In that case, you’re specifically 
telling the assassin to commit a murder. I’m not telling meat 
companies to torture animals, and they don’t have to do that. 
They’re just deciding to do it that way, on their own initiative.
V: Okay, different example. You have a friend named “Killian,” 
who happens to be a murderer. One day, you offer Killian 
$20,000 to get you a new car. Killian could carry out this task 
in a perfectly moral manner. But you know that the way he will 
in fact do it is by murdering some innocent person and stealing 
their car. You know this because Killian has performed tasks 
like this for you in the past, he always murders people along 
the way, and you always pay him for it afterward. You don’t 
specifically tell him to murder anyone; you just know that that’s 
the way he does things. So you tell Killian to get a car, he goes 
off, kills someone, steals their car, gives it to you, and you pay 
him $20,000. End of story. Did you act morally in this story?
M: I don’t like that story. I would never act that way.
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V: Of course not. But let’s understand why not.
M: Well, I don’t want to support murder or theft. 
V: Glad to hear it. Moreover, it would be wrong to do so, 
wouldn’t it?
M: It seems wrong.
V: Well, that’s like buying factory farmed meat. You didn’t tell 
them to commit acts of extreme cruelty, but you know that that 
is how they do things, and you keep paying them for the prod-
uct.
M: But in your story, when I ask Killian to get me a car, the 
murder and theft hasn’t yet occurred, and I’m going to cause 
it to occur. In the case of buying meat, the animal has already 
been tortured and killed.
V: True. If you like, we can change the example. Say Killian 
has a business. He murders people and steals their cars, then 
sells them. That’s where all of his cars come from. You go to 
Killian to buy a car. You buy a car that has already been stolen, 
and whose owner is already dead. Does this make it okay to 
buy cars from Killian?
M: I guess not. But I still think that’s different from buying 
meat.
V: How is it different?
M: Well, Killian is a single person with a small business. So 
when you buy a car from Killian, that might cause him to go 
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out and kill another person and steal their car, to replenish his 
stock of cars.
V: Right. And when people buy meat, that might cause the 
meat companies to raise and slaughter more animals to replen-
ish their stock.
M: But the meat industry is so large that I don’t think it would. 
They’re not going to respond to such a small change as a single 
person giving up meat.
V: Would they respond if a million people gave up meat?
M: Of course. Then they’d obviously reduce their production.
V: What if a thousand people gave up meat? Would the indus-
try reduce their production then?
M: Probably.
V: What would you guess is the minimum number of people 
that would cause the meat industry to reduce its production, if 
they gave up meat?
M: I don’t know.
V: Just take a guess for the sake of argument. It doesn’t matter 
if your guess is wrong.
M: (shrugs) Fine. Maybe if a hundred people gave up meat, 
then the industry would reduce its production. But I can’t make 
a hundred people do that.
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V: Alright. Now, if they reduced their production in response 
to 100 people giving up meat, then they’d reduce it by about the 
amount that 100 people eat, right?
M: I guess so.
V: But you know, you and I are not the only ones who are think-
ing about ethical vegetarianism. Other people in our society 
periodically give up meat in response to ethical reasons. On 
our current hypothesis, every time 100 people give up meat, 
the industry reduces its production by the amount eaten by 100 
people.
M: Okay.
V: Well, that means that you might trigger a reduction in pro-
duction like that. If 99 other people have given up eating meat 
since the last time they reassessed their production, then you’ll 
be the hundredth. Then you’ll push them over the 100-person 
threshold, causing them to reduce production by the amount 
that 100 people eat.
M: Yeah, but that seems really unlikely.
V: It is: it’s only 1% likely. But if it happens, it’ll reduce produc-
tion by 100 times the amount that a single person eats. So it’s 
worth it.21
21  Here, V follows the arguments of Gaverick Matheny (“Expected Util-
ity, Contributory Causation, and Vegetarianism,” Journal of Applied Philos-
ophy 19 [2002]: 293-7); Norcross (“Puppies, Pigs, and People,” pp. 232-3); 
and Rachels (“Vegetarianism,” p. 886).
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M: Okay, but this reasoning was just based on a guess that I 
made. I just guessed that it takes 100 people to cause the meat 
industry to respond.
V: True. But similar reasoning would apply no matter what 
guess you’d made. If you had guessed “86” instead of “100,” 
then I would have said: there’s a 1/86 probability that you’ll 
cause the industry to respond, in which case they’ll reduce pro-
duction by the amount that 86 people eat. It’s still worth it to 
give up meat.
M: I see. But you’re still assuming that there was some cor-
rect answer, some specific number of vegetarians who would 
induce the meat industry to reduce production. 
V: And that’s not true?
M: I don’t think so.
V: You mean that the industry won’t reduce production no mat-
ter how many people give up meat?
M: No, I don’t mean that. I mean that there might be no par-
ticular number at which it would happen.
V: If a million people gave up meat, one after another, the meat 
industry would reduce production at some point, right?
M: Presumably.
V: Well, whenever it happened, it would be after some particu-
lar number of people. There’s no way of reducing production 
just in general, without doing it at any particular time.
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M: Yeah. But maybe each time someone gives up meat, there’s 
just a chance that they’ll reduce production, but it’s not deter-
mined in advance exactly when it will happen.
V: Maybe, but this still doesn’t undermine my argument. As 
long as there’s that chance that they’ll reduce production, you 
have a reason to give up buying meat, since you could trigger 
a large reduction.
M: But maybe if a bunch of people give up meat, instead of 
reducing production, the meat industry will just lower prices 
so they can still sell all the meat they produce, to the remaining 
meat eaters.
V: Well, you’ve brought up a real point from economics, but 
you’ve oversimplified it. In standard economic theory, when 
demand for a product declines, the producers lower the price 
and reduce production. So if many people give up eating meat, 
then they’ll lower the price and reduce production.
M: Okay. So with the lower price, other meat eaters will in-
crease their meat eating. Which will reduce the impact of my 
sacrifice. Before I go to all the trouble of converting to a veg-
etarian diet, I want to know how much impact it’s going to have 
on meat production.
V: It happens that agricultural economists have looked into 
this. They’ve done empirical studies of the market for meat in 
the U.S. They find that, on average, if you reduce your meat 
purchases by one pound, producers will decrease their produc-
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tion by 0.68 pounds (for beef), 0.76 pounds (for chicken), or 
0.74 pounds (for pork).22
M: Wait, you’re saying the industry responds to every one-
pound change in demand? You mean a single pound per year?
V: No, they don’t respond every time. I’m saying that’s the 
average effect. And because it’s an average, it doesn’t matter 
if you’re talking about a pound per day, a pound per year, or 
whatever.
M: Okay. But your argument was assuming that meat produc-
tion is falling because of people becoming vegetarian. I’ve 
heard that overall meat consumption increases in most years. 
Not to cast any aspersions on your persuasiveness, but new 
meat-eaters are entering the market faster than people are giv-
ing up meat.23
V: True. But all the above arguments also apply in reverse.
M: What do you mean “in reverse”?
V: I mean, just as a decline in demand causes a drop in pro-
duction, an increase in demand causes a rise in production. 
So, according to the economists I was referring to, if you buy 
one more pound of meat, that’ll cause the industry, on aver-
22  F. Bailey Norwood and Jayson L. Lusk, Compassion, by the Pound: 
The Economics of Farm Animal Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 223. The comparable figures are 0.56 for milk, 0.69 for veal, and 
0.91 for eggs.
23  See Carrie R. Daniel, Amanda J. Cross, Corinna Koebnick, and 
Rashmi Sinha, “Trends in Meat Consumption in the United States,” Public 
Health Nutrition 14 (2011): 575-83.
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age, to increase their production by 0.68 pounds (for beef), 0.76 
pounds (for chicken), or 0.74 pounds (for pork). If meat produc-
tion is on the rise, then by giving up meat, you reduce the rate 
at which it rises. If it’s on the decline, then you increase the rate 
of decline.
M: Wait a minute. If the meat industry reduces its production, 
then farm animals won’t be better off; there will just be fewer 
of them. It’s better to have a low-quality life than not to live 
at all. So we’re doing future generations of animals a favor by 
eating animals today!24
V: Would you accept this argument if it were applied to people? 
What if a particular race of people were bred solely to serve as 
slaves? Then you could say that those particular people would 
not have existed if not for the practice of slavery. Would this 
make slavery okay?
M: Of course not. But maybe that’s because humans have more 
rights than animals do. Once a person exists, you have to re-
spect their rights, no matter what the reason was for bringing 
them into existence. But you don’t have to respect animals’ 
rights.
V: And why don’t animals have rights?
M: I don’t know; I haven’t figured out the basis for rights yet.
24  Here, M follows the reasoning of Lomasky (“Is It Wrong to Eat Ani-
mals?”, pp. 190-91) and John Zeis (“A Rawlsian Pro-Life Argument Against 
Vegetarianism,” International Philosophical Quarterly 53 [2013]: 63-71, at 
pp. 69-70).
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V: Well, it doesn’t matter, because life on a factory farm is 
much worse than no life at all. It would be much better not to 
create billions of utterly miserable lives.
M: Really? Why do you think it’s worse than no life at all?
V: I could start describing the conditions on factory farms 
again, but I think you need to see it. Go look up some videos 
on factory farming, then I think you’ll agree with me.25
M: Okay. But this all assumes utilitarianism, doesn’t it? I mean, 
you’re assuming that the morally right action is just a matter 
of what produces the most expected pleasure, or the least ex-
pected pain, where you weight each good or bad possible con-
sequence by the probability that it will occur.
V: No, I’m not assuming utilitarianism. I thought you were as-
suming utilitarianism.
M: Me? How so?
V: You were making the argument that it’s okay to patronize an 
immoral industry, provided that doing so doesn’t cause them to 
increase their immoral actions. That’s something a utilitarian 
might say. That’s not my view.
M: What would your view be?
V: My view would be that it’s wrong to patronize extremely 
immoral businesses. It doesn’t matter if you’re causing them to 
25  See, for example, Mercy for Animals, “What Cody Saw Will Change 
Your Life” (video), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FhHgYjymNU, 
accessed Nov. 29,2017.
Michael Huemer
61
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
do it, or if they’ve already done it and you’re paying them after 
the fact.
M: If it’s not contributing to the amount of immoral behavior, 
what’s wrong with it?
V: Two things: one, you’re rewarding wrongful behavior, which 
is unjust. You’re contributing to making it so that immorality 
pays—
M: But that’s always true. A lot of immoral behavior has been 
paying for a long time.
V: But from a moral point of view, you’re responsible for your 
own role in the system. You’re not necessarily obligated to fix 
the world’s injustices, but you are obligated not to become a 
part of them. Second, whether or not immorality pays, you 
have a duty not to become party to a crime after the fact. You 
should not willingly make it the case that great wrongs are 
done for you. 
M: I’m not sure it would be true that animals were tormented 
and killed “for me”; after all, the people on the farms don’t 
know anything about me in particular.
V: It’s done for the meat customers. You’re a part of that class, 
so it’s done in part for you, as well as all the other meat custom-
ers.
M: But if a wrong is going to be committed regardless of what 
we do, shouldn’t we make the most of it by taking whatever 
advantage can be gained from it?
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V: I doubt you would think that in other contexts. Say you live 
in Nazi Germany. Someone offers you a job helping load Jews 
into gas chambers for execution. It pays a little more than your 
current job. If you turn down the job, they’ll just get someone 
else to do it. Would you take the job? 
M: No, but . . . 
V: The wrong is going to be done anyway; why not take per-
sonal advantage of it?
M: That’s kind of messed up.
V: That’s my point.
M: So you’re assuming an anti-utilitarian ethics, then.
V: No, I’m saying that meat-eating is wrong either way. On 
any reasonable moral view, it’s wrong to inflict severe pain and 
suffering on others without good reason. So factory farming is 
wrong. If you’re a utilitarian, you should give up meat because 
doing so reduces the expected number of animals suffering on 
factory farms. If you’re not a utilitarian, you should give up 
meat because you don’t want to be party to serious immorality.
M: Okay, fine. But all this turns on the pain allegedly suffered 
by farm animals. How can we really be sure that nonhuman 
animals feel pain?26
26  Rene Descartes famously held that nonhuman animals are mere 
mindless automata. See his letter to Henry More dated Feb. 5, 1649 in The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3, tr. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 365-6.
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V: You can’t be 100% certain of anything about the external 
world. I mean, I can’t be 100% sure that you feel pain. Maybe 
you’re just a mindless automaton. Does that mean I should feel 
free to torture you?
M: No, that won’t be okay.
V: Which shows that I don’t have to be 100% certain that I’m 
inflicting pain in order for my action to be wrong. If there’s 
even a good chance that you can feel pain, I shouldn’t torture 
you.
M: Okay, then why is there even a good chance that animals 
feel pain?
V: One, they act like they feel pain. They sometimes scream, 
try to escape, and so on. They do this under the same con-
ditions that would make you scream or try to escape, e.g., if 
someone cut off one of your body parts. Two, animals have the 
same physiological structures that explain your capacity to feel 
pain – the same sort of pain sensors in the body, connected up 
to the same brain areas. That’s why no animal scientist seri-
ously doubts that farm animals feel pain.
M: Alright, so they feel pain. But animals eat each other all the 
time. So why shouldn’t we eat them?27
27  Here, M follows the reasoning of Benjamin Franklin (The Autobiog-
raphy of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Charles W. Elliot, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Press, 2007, p. 32): “[W]hen the fish were opened, I saw smaller fish 
taken out of their stomachs; then thought I, ‘If you eat one another, I don’t 
see why we mayn’t eat you.’ So I din’d upon cod very heartily, and contin-
ued to eat with other people, returning only now and then occasionally to a 
vegetable diet. So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since 
it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.”
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V: Are you saying that anything done by an animal is morally 
permissible for you to do?
M: Well, no. If an animal killed a person, that wouldn’t show 
that it was okay to kill people. It’s just that the animals couldn’t 
complain about being eaten by us, since they eat each other.
V: You know, humans sometimes kill other humans. Would 
you accept this reasoning: “humans can’t complain about being 
killed, since they sometimes kill each other”?
M: Well, maybe the particular people who have committed a 
murder can’t complain if we kill them. We can execute mur-
derers. Of course we can’t just kill any human merely because 
some other humans have murdered.
V: So by similar logic, animals that have killed other animals 
may be killed in turn? Like capital punishment for animals?
M: Sure.
V: But the chickens, pigs, and cows on the farms don’t eat each 
other, and they don’t kill other animals.
M: Well, chickens sometimes eat insects and worms.
V: Okay, chickens eat other species, so it’s okay to kill chick-
ens. But people also eat other species, so . . . it’s okay to kill 
people?
M: That’s awful.
V: I’m just following the logic of your argument.
Michael Huemer
65
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
M: Fine. Now let’s follow the logic of your argument. You’re 
saying it’s wrong to eat animals. Then it must also be wrong 
for animals to eat other animals, right? Is it wrong for a lion to 
eat a gazelle?
V: I dunno, what do you think?
M: I say it’s not wrong, because it’s natural for animals to eat 
each other.
V: Do you think lions are moral agents?
M: What do you mean by “moral agents”?
V: Do they have free will? And are they able to regulate their 
behavior according to moral principles?
M: No to both. Animals just act on instinct.
V: Then nothing is morally right or wrong for a lion.
M: You’re saying morality only applies to things with free will 
that can regulate their behavior morally?
V: Don’t you agree? You don’t blame a baby for crying on an 
airplane, or a hurricane for destroying a city, or a lion for kill-
ing a gazelle. Because none of them are capable of regulating 
their behavior morally.
M: But then how can similar actions be wrong for us?
V: We have free will and are able to regulate our behavior ac-
cording to moral principles.
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M: That’s so unfair. Lions get to do whatever they want, but we 
have to restrain ourselves?
V: That’s the nature of morality.
M: Okay, lions can’t restrain themselves. But do you think we 
should stop lions from killing gazelles?28
V: If you can figure out a way of doing that without killing all 
the lions and disrupting the ecology, then we should consider 
it. In the meanwhile, though, I know a way that we could pre-
vent ourselves from slaughtering animals, without us dying. 
We could just eat vegetables.
M: But if animals can’t have moral obligations, then doesn’t 
that mean that they can’t have moral rights either? I’ve heard 
from conservative moralists that rights imply obligations.
V: My case for vegetarianism didn’t rely on any claims about 
“rights.” Remember that it was all compatible with utilitari-
anism. I’m only assuming that you shouldn’t inflict enormous 
pain and suffering for minor reasons.
M: Let me rephrase. If it’s impossible for some creature to do 
wrong, then it’s also impossible for anyone to do wrong to that 
creature.
28  Ned Hettinger raises this question as a problem for animal welfare 
advocates in “Valuing Predation in Rolston’s Environmental Ethics: Bambi 
Lovers versus Tree Huggers,” Environmental Ethics 16 (1994): 3-20. For re-
plies, see Jennifer Everett, “Environmental Ethics, Animal Welfarism, and 
the Problem of Predation: A Bambi Lover’s Respect for Nature,” Ethics and 
the Environment 6 (2001): 42-67; Anne Baril, “Equality, Flourishing, and 
the Problem of Predation,” in The Moral Rights of Animals, ed. Mylan Engel 
and Gary Comstock (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 81-103.
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V: Why do you think that?
M: Morality only protects those who can understand morality.29
V: Again, why do you think that?
M: It sounded good when I said it.
V: Let me give you a couple of examples. You’re saying moral-
ity only protects those who can understand morality. Babies 
can’t understand morality. It follows that, on your view, morali-
ty doesn’t protect babies. So it would be alright to torture them.
M: That’s terrible.
V: Another example. Say you have an adult human who can’t 
understand morality. Like a mentally disabled person. Can we 
torture them?
M: No.
V: Or a psychopath – again, they can’t understand morality. 
Can we torture them?
M: Well, if they commit crimes, we should put them in jail.
V: Don’t change the subject. I’m not asking about jail; I’m ask-
ing about torture. And I’m not asking if you can do it because 
29  This view is taken by Timothy Hsiao (“In Defense of Eating Meat,” 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 [2015]: 277-91), who 
claims that infants and the mentally disabled possess a “root capacity” for 
rationality even if they can never exercise it. Cohen (“A Critique of the Al-
leged Moral Basis for Vegetarianism”) argues on similar grounds that ani-
mals lack rights, though we may still have weighty obligations toward them.
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they committed a crime; I’m asking if you can do it simply 
because they can’t understand morality.
M: Well, no, that would be wrong.
V: So it’s not true that morality only protects those who can un-
derstand morality. Morality protects infants, mentally disabled 
people, and psychopaths from gratuitous infliction of pain and 
suffering. So why not animals?
M: Maybe morality is the result of a social contract, so it only 
protects those who are members of our society.30 The mentally 
disabled person, baby, and psychopath are all members of our 
society, despite their limited understanding.
V: So if you meet a person from another society, you can tor-
ture and kill them?
M: No, because they could join our society.
V: What if they can’t because our society has rules that perma-
nently exclude them? Then we can torture them?
M: No, because they could be members of our society if we 
were to change our practices.
V: Okay. So a mentally disabled person from another society 
is protected because our society could adopt that person as a 
member?
M: I guess so.
30  Jan Narveson takes a similar view in “On a Case for Animal Rights,” 
The Monist 70 (1987): 31-49.
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V: Then why wouldn’t animals also be protected because our 
society could adopt them as members?
M: Animals are never true members of society, not even when 
we treat them as if they were.
V: Why not?
M: Well, they never really reciprocate – they don’t understand 
the social rules, they don’t engage in public deliberation; things 
like that.
V: Okay. But the same is true of severely mentally disabled 
people. So we could torture them, right?
M: No. But . . . eating meat is natural! People have done it for 
all of history. We have teeth adapted for chewing meat, see? 
(points to canines) But eating mentally disabled humans isn’t 
natural.
V: You’re a big fan of naturalness, are you?
M: Sure . . . sometimes. Sometimes I like to follow nature.
V: Those hot dogs that you enjoy: do you know how many un-
natural ingredients they stick in those things?
M: So maybe I should give up the hot dogs. But other meat 
products are more natural.
V: What do you mean by “natural”?
M: You know, meat-eating follows our instincts. We evolved to 
do it. It’s what our ancestors have always done.
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V: Our ancestors didn’t run factory farms.
M: Yeah, but they ate meat, and we need factory farms today in 
order to provide the amount of meat we want to eat at a reason-
able price.
V: Our ancestors also did some other things that I bet you 
wouldn’t approve of. Slavery, wars of conquest, oppression of 
women, torture . . .
M: Okay, scratch the point about ancestors. But it’s still natural 
because it follows our instincts and we evolved to do it.
V: Do you think that everything that’s natural is good?
M: Well, not necessarily good per se . . .
V: But at least okay? Is everything that’s natural something 
that’s okay?
M: Sure.
V: You know, cancer is natural. So are earthquakes, hurricanes, 
. . .
M: Okay, those things are bad. But I’m just talking about be-
havior. Behaviors that are natural are okay.
V: I think war is natural too.
M: How could that be natural?
V: Well, people have been doing it for all of human history. 
That’s some evidence that it’s natural for humans, isn’t it? Just 
as eating meat is natural for us? Primitive tribes make war even 
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more than we do.31 There seems to be some sort of human in-
stinct to conquer and dominate other people. 
M: I don’t see how an instinct for war could evolve – wars are 
so destructive.
V: According to one theory, men in primitive tribes would at-
tack a neighboring tribe to kill the neighboring tribe’s men and 
kidnap and rape its women. In our evolutionary past, the men 
who succeeded in doing this sort of thing tended to leave be-
hind more offspring than peaceful men who stayed at home. 
They passed on their genes for aggressive behavior. That’s how 
the instinct for war evolved.32
M: I don’t know that I want to buy into that. That’s a very cyni-
cal and nasty theory.
V: Yeah, it’s unpleasant. But at least it’s a possible explanation 
of war, right?
M: I guess it’s possible.
V: So here’s my question: would you say that if that theory is 
correct, then war is good?
M: I’m pretty sure that war is bad.
V: But if the theory I described is correct, then war is natural. 
So then it would have to be good, right?
31  See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature (New York: Vi-
king, 2011).
32  See Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1997), pp. 513-17.
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M: Well, I guess not everything natural is necessarily good. 
But I’ve also heard that God gave humans souls, and He didn’t 
give souls to animals.
V: What’s a soul?
M: I’m not sure exactly. It’s some immaterial component of a 
person that goes to heaven after you die.
V: And how do we know that there are any such things?
M: Perhaps because we have conscious experiences. The ex-
istence of a soul explains how inanimate matter differs from 
conscious beings.33 There’s a certain way that it feels to be us, 
but there’s nothing that it feels like to be a hunk of matter.
V: In that case, I think animals have souls too. They have expe-
riences; there’s something that it feels like to be a cow. 
M: But they can’t reason using abstract concepts! Also, they 
don’t go to heaven or hell when they die, according to tradi-
tional religions. 
V: So their souls are non-rational and mortal.
M: Right. Only humans have rational, immortal souls.
V: I’m not seeing how this makes it okay to torture and kill 
animals for trivial reasons. If anything, now it sounds like it’s 
33  See Rene Descartes’ famous defense of mind/body dualism in his 
Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Des-
cartes, vol. 2, tr. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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even worse to kill an animal than a human. At least the human 
gets an afterlife; the animal is just gone forever.
M: But the Bible says that God granted us dominion over the 
Earth and all its creatures.34
V: Did he give us the Earth and its creatures to torment, or to 
watch over as responsible stewards?
M: Well, “responsible steward” sounds more like the sort of 
thing God would expect of us.
V: Is there a Bible verse that says torturing animals for minor 
reasons is okay?
M: No, but I can’t find any verse that says it’s not okay.
V: It also doesn’t say that insider trading is wrong.
M: What does that have to do with this?
V: The point being that the Bible isn’t an exhaustive list of ev-
erything that’s right and wrong. We also have to exercise our 
conscience.
M: Okay, I’m not defending factory farming. The point about 
the soul was just to explain why we have rights and animals 
don’t – in response to the extreme animal rights advocates.
34  Genesis 1:26 (King James Version): “And God said, Let us make man 
in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish 
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the 
earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”
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V: I don’t think it even explains that. It’s at least possible that 
we don’t really have immortal souls, right?
M: I guess it’s possible.
V: Okay. If it turns out that we don’t have immortal souls, will 
we then have no rights?
M: No.
V: So it looks like the reason you believe we have rights is not 
really that we have immortal souls.
M: (sighs, looks at watch) Okay. I haven’t figured out why 
you’re wrong yet, but I’ll try again next week.
V: Agreed. Same time and place?
M: Actually, there’s a new Chinese restaurant I’d like to try. It’s 
supposed to have a great Kung Pao Chicken.
V: No.
M: Come on, you don’t have to eat the chicken. They have veg-
etarian dishes too.
V: I’m not going there to watch you eat meat.
M: Why not?
V: Have you forgotten the conversation we just had?
M: No, I know you’re against eating meat. I just didn’t realize 
you had such a problem with other people eating meat. That’s 
so judgy.
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V: You must not have understood my position. I haven’t just 
been reporting personal preferences; I’m not saying “I per-
sonally prefer not to eat meat.” I’m saying it’s morally wrong. 
That’s what all the arguments have been about. That means it’s 
just as wrong for you to do it.
M: I understand that that’s your opinion. But what gives you 
the right to judge me?
V: Are you judging me for judging you?
M: Uh oh, that feels like one of those self-referential paradoxes. 
If it’s wrong to judge people, then it’s wrong to judge that it’s 
wrong to judge people . . . 
V: Look, it doesn’t require any special rights to make a moral 
evaluation. If you see someone do something, and you have 
enough evidence that it was wrong, then you can and should 
draw the conclusion that they acted wrongly. You don’t need 
to be some special authority figure with special rights or any-
thing. If you saw me beat up a child, you would rightly con-
clude that I was behaving badly. You wouldn’t refuse to draw 
any conclusions, just to avoid being “judgy.”
M: Okay fine, I’ll meet you here again so I won’t offend your 
delicate sensibilities. But I still want you to know that I’m feel-
ing pretty judged here.
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Day 3: Consciousness and rational belief
Setting: M and V sharing a third wonderful vegan meal.
M: Hey V, I think I figured out why human pain matters more 
than animals’.
V: Do tell.
M: Okay, so there are positive and negative mental states, right? 
Pleasure, happiness, and other forms of enjoyment are positive. 
Pain, unhappiness, and other kinds of suffering are negative. 
V: Sounds right.
M: But mental states, in general, can be conscious or uncon-
scious. You can have conscious or unconscious desires, beliefs, 
and even emotions.
V: All this is well known.
M: Here’s the interesting part. Conscious versus unconscious 
isn’t a binary distinction; it’s a matter of degree. Mental states 
can be more or less conscious, not simply conscious or uncon-
scious.
V: So you can have a semi-conscious belief or desire, one that 
you’re only half aware of?
M: Right. Now, when it comes to negative states, the less con-
scious they are, the less bad. If there could be a completely 
unconscious pain, then it wouldn’t be intrinsically bad at all.
V: Maybe. But I’m not sure the idea of an unconscious pain 
makes sense. Unconscious belief, sure. But unconscious pain?
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M: But there can be more or less conscious pains. Say you 
have a back pain. I decide to distract you from it by engaging 
you with a delightful philosophical paradox. You start to pay 
less attention to the pain, and so you start to become less and 
less conscious of it. After we’ve been arguing for a half hour, 
you’ve forgotten about your pain.
V: Yeah, I’ve had experiences like that.
M: And my distracting you would be a good thing, right?
V: Fair enough. So you’re saying that the pain becomes less 
bad as it becomes less conscious. Where are you going with 
this? You’re not going to claim that animal pain is always un-
conscious, are you?
M: No, but it might be less conscious than typical human pain. 
Animals have much less self-awareness in general than hu-
mans. Some people doubt whether animals are self-aware in 
general. So it’s plausible that all their mental states have only 
a low level of consciousness. They’re only dimly aware of the 
things they are aware of. In that case, their pain would be less 
bad than typical (fully conscious) human pains.
V: Interesting theory. This is the first time I’ve heard someone 
give an explanation for why animal pain matters less than hu-
man pain that makes sense. Usually, you guys pick on arbitrary 
properties, like IQ.
M: So you don’t think level of consciousness is morally arbi-
trary?
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V: No, that really seems to make a difference to the intrinsic 
value of an experience. This time, your moral claim is actually 
intuitive.
M: At last, you’ve conceded that I made a good point!
V: Yes, but let’s explore a few implications of this theory. First, 
say we have a newborn baby . . .
M: Oh no, it’s back to the infants and mentally disabled people 
again?
V: Well, they seem to have similar cognitive capacities to non-
human animals, so it’s good to test our intuitions on them, to 
make sure we’re not influenced by mere bias against other spe-
cies. 
M: Oh, I’m sure I’m not biased against other species. I just have 
a rational assessment of their capacities.
V: I’m not convinced that infants or severely mentally disabled 
people have more self-awareness, or more “consciousness” as 
you say, than animals. So would it be okay to torture infants 
and mentally disabled people?
M: That doesn’t seem right. Maybe their experiences are all 
still fully conscious, even though they have much lower gen-
eral intelligence.
V: Maybe. Or maybe not. Do you want to rest the ethical treat-
ment of these people on that speculation?
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M: Hm. Well, since we’re not sure of their level of conscious-
ness, I would say it makes sense to err on the side of caution 
and not inflict needless suffering on them.
V: That sounds completely reasonable. Similarly, since we’re 
not sure of the level of consciousness of nonhuman animals, it 
makes sense to err on the side of caution and not inflict need-
less suffering on them.
M: I guess I’m saying that animals are less conscious than hu-
man infants, or at least less likely to pass any given threshold 
level of awareness.
V: Is there any evidence for that?
M: Maybe the fact that infants are going to be fully conscious 
later?
V: That’s true, but it’s also true that they were fully non-con-
scious in the recent past (at an early stage of fetal development). 
They’re in transition from fully unaware to fully aware beings. 
I don’t see why you should assume that, upon emerging from 
the womb, they’re immediately more conscious than an adult 
animal. Who knows, maybe animals are more conscious than 
infants.
M: I admit, it’s hard to say. I can’t think right now of a way we 
could test for degrees of consciousness of someone’s mental 
states.
V: So it looks like we should err on the side of caution and 
avoid hurting any of these beings – animals, infants, or men-
tally disabled people – unless we have a very good reason.
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M: Or maybe we should reason in the opposite direction. 
Maybe we should say that since we aren’t sure of their level 
of awareness, we should discount the interests of all of these 
beings. We should give preference to normal, intelligent adults.
V: Maybe. But how much preference? Would you be willing to 
say that the pain of a normal adult matters a million times more 
than the pain of an infant?
M: What do you think I am, some kind of crazy extremist?
V: I’ll take that as a no. Then you shouldn’t take the crazy ex-
tremist view about animals either.
M: But do you agree that human pains are more important than 
animal pains?
V: I don’t know, but it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter if a hu-
man pain is 50% worse, or twice as bad, or ten times as bad, as 
a similarly-caused animal pain. The amount of animal suffer-
ing we’re causing each year is still vastly greater than the ben-
efits we gain. Remember, we’re torturing and killing 74 billion 
land animals per year.
M: I remember. But why do you keep using that emotionally 
charged word, “torture”?
V: It’s an accurate description. If a human being were confined 
in a tiny cage all day, forced to sit in his own excrement, forced 
to breathe ammonia, with a small part of his body having been 
cut off, you wouldn’t hesitate to call it “torture.” Of course the 
word has negative emotional connotations, because the phe-
nomenon that it refers to is awful. That doesn’t make it an inac-
curate or unfair description.
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M: (sigh) Okay, so even if my theory about degrees of con-
sciousness is correct, I’m still obligated to give up meat.
V: That’s about it.
M: But I don’t understand why you’re so obsessed with this 
problem. Shouldn’t we first solve the enormous problems our 
own species faces, before we start worrying about other spe-
cies?
V: What problems do you mean?
M: You know, like war, poverty, and disease.
V: We can work on all those things while at the same time be-
ing vegetarians.
M: Yeah, but you seem to spend a lot more time worrying about 
the problems with the meat industry than you do worrying 
about human problems.
V: If you meet an AIDS researcher, would you criticize them 
for trying to cure AIDS, when they could instead be trying to 
cure cancer?
M: I guess we can work on both. But cancer and AIDS are of 
roughly comparable badness.
V: Okay, say you meet someone who’s worried about the prob-
lem of internet bullying. Would you tell them to stop worrying 
about bullying until we first cure cancer?
M: I guess not. But you still haven’t answered what makes you 
so interested in animal welfare.
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V: You’re right, I haven’t. I think factory farming is the world’s 
greatest problem, and it’s also one of the most neglected.
M: How could a problem for mere animals be worse than the 
worst human problem?
V: It’s estimated that the number of people who have ever lived 
on Earth is about 108 billion.35 So in just two years, the meat in-
dustry slaughters more animals than the total number of human 
beings who have ever existed. Most endure great suffering be-
fore the slaughter. It may be that a few years of factory farming 
causes more suffering than all the suffering in human history.36
M: But there are other problems that humans face besides suf-
fering.
V: Granted. But suffering is still a huge problem. If a single 
cause accounted for all the human suffering in history, would 
that thing be a big problem or a small problem?
M: Big problem.
V: And if that thing was a practice that we could change at the 
cost of a moderate amount of pleasure for a couple of years, 
would you think it worthwhile working to change that practice?
35  Live Science, “The Dead Outnumber the Living,” Feb. 7, 2012, https://
www.livescience.com/18336-human-population-dead-living-infographic.
html.
36  Compare Rachels’ argument that American factory farms over the last 
twenty years have caused at least five thousand times more suffering than 
the Holocaust (“Vegetarianism,” p. 897). But note that Rachels does not take 
account of the short lifespan of farm animals.
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M: Sure. But I’m not convinced that factory farming really 
causes that much suffering.
V: Do you accept my numbers?
M: Yeah, but I think you’ve oversimplified. Most humans have 
long lives compared to farm animals. How long does a farm 
animal live?
V: Most of the animals people eat are chickens, which live 
around 40 days before being slaughtered. Pigs and cows live 
much longer, but there aren’t so many.37 So I’d guess the aver-
age lifespan of a food animal might be around 45 days.
M: So only 45 days of suffering. We live much longer, so an 
average human life probably contains way more suffering. I bet 
that human history contains much more total suffering than the 
suffering caused by two years of factory farming.
V:  Fair point. What about, say, the last 20 years of factory 
farming?
M: Still not sure. Remember that I think animal suffering 
might be less conscious than human suffering.
V: Well, we don’t need to work this out exactly. A practice need 
not cause more suffering than all the suffering in human his-
37  On farm animal lifespans, see Four Paws, “Farm Animal Life Expec-
tancy,” http://www.four-paws.us/campaigns/farm-animals-/farm-animal-
life-expectancy/, accessed December 5, 2017. On the relative numbers of 
each type of animal, see One Green Planet, “Animals Killed for Food in 
the U.S. Increases in 2010,” October 21, 2011, http://www.onegreenplanet.
org/news/animals-killed-for-food-in-the-u-s-increases-in-2010/, accessed 
December 5, 2017.
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tory, in order to be worth our while to change. Clearly factory 
farming has caused an enormous amount of suffering.
M: True.
V: And it’s going to continue year after year if no one does 
anything about it.
M: Also true. I was just reacting to the idea that it’s the world’s 
greatest problem.
V: And I was reacting to your suggestion that we shouldn’t 
worry about this until we’ve solved all human problems. It’s 
open to debate whether factory farming has caused more suf-
fering than all the suffering in human history. But either way, 
it’s at least a reasonable candidate for being the world’s worst 
problem. And even if it isn’t the number one worst problem, it 
is still clearly incredibly horrible.
M: I’m sorry, but this is making you sound like a crazy extrem-
ist.
V: Is there something wrong with my reasoning?
M: I don’t know what’s wrong with it. But the idea that animal 
agriculture is worse than the problem of war, or poverty, or dis-
ease, just sounds to me so extreme that it makes me want to say 
there must be something wrong with your argument.
V: And you think that’s enough to reject the argument?
Michael Huemer
85
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
M: I do. I learned that from G.E. Moore: if you have an argu-
ment for a conclusion that seems crazy, you should reject it, 
even if you can’t say exactly what’s wrong with it.38 
V: G.E. Moore was responding to philosophical skeptics who 
argue that no one knows anything about the world outside their 
own minds.
M: Right. The idea that I don’t know, e.g., whether I have hands 
is so implausible on its face that if I hear an argument for that 
conclusion, I should infer that some step in the argument is 
wrong, even if I can’t say which one or why.
V: And you think I’m like the philosophical skeptic.
M: Well, some of your views also sound crazy at first glance.
V: Okay, let’s examine that reaction. Would you agree that 
sometimes we should accept conclusions that initially sound 
crazy?
M: I don’t know. What do you have in mind?
V: Here’s an example I once heard. Imagine that you have a 
very large but very thin sheet of paper, one thousandth of an 
inch thick. You fold it in half, making it two thousandths of 
an inch thick. Then fold it in half again, making it four thou-
sandths of an inch thick. And so on. After folding it fifty times, 
how thick would it be?
38  See, for example, G.E. Moore, “Hume’s Theory Examined” in Some 
Main Problems of Philosophy, ed. H.D. Lewis (New York: Macmillan, 
1953), pp. 108-26.
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M: I don’t know. Let me get out my calculator. (pulls calculator 
out of backpack)
V: First just take an intuitive guess.
M: Um . . . ten feet?
V: Sounds reasonable. Most people will agree that the answer 
is something under a hundred feet. What would you say if I told 
you that the correct answer is over seventeen million miles?
M: That’s crazy!
V: Yeah, it’s crazy. But it’s definitely correct. Enter it on your 
calculator. 0.001 inches, multiplied by two to the fiftieth power.
M: (types on calculator, reads result) 1.12 x 1012.
V: That’s the number of inches. To convert to feet, divide by 
twelve. Then to convert to miles, divide by 5,280.
M: You’re right, it’s almost eighteen million. But that’s crazy.
V: Do you think your calculator is lying to you?
M: Of course not.
V: Do you think there must be something wrong with the argu-
ment because the conclusion is so crazy?
M: (sigh) No, it’s correct. I’m not unreasonable, you know. It’s 
just very surprising.
V: So sometimes we should accept conclusions that sound cra-
zy.
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M: Yeah, but that’s a math problem. Ethical judgments are dif-
ferent.
V: Different how?
M: I’m not sure. Maybe because ethical premises are less cer-
tain and less reliable than descriptive, factual premises.
V: Wouldn’t that mean that your sense of what is “crazy” in 
ethics is also less reliable?
M: I guess so. But my point is that your ethical argument is less 
reliable than a mathematical calculation or a scientific claim 
or an observation of the physical world. That’s why the sense 
of “craziness” could be enough to defeat an ethical argument, 
even though it wouldn’t defeat a mathematical calculation, sci-
entific theory, or physical observation.
V: Perhaps. But before we conclude that, let’s first try to figure 
out where the craziness comes from.
M: What do you mean by “where it comes from”?
V: Sometimes, we can identify the particular point in an ar-
gument where things become surprising. Take the example of 
the folded paper. First I say that the thickness of the paper af-
ter fifty folds is 0.001 inches times 250. That statement isn’t 
weird or surprising or controversial. What’s surprising is just 
how enormous two to the fiftieth power turns out to be. That’s 
where the “craziness” of the final answer comes from.
M: Yeah, I was pretty surprised by that. I guess I’m not so good 
with large numbers. But I trust the calculator.
Michael Huemer
88
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
V: That’s why it’s not reasonable to conclude that there must be 
something wrong with the argument.
M: Okay, but how does this apply to your argument? You 
say factory farming is the worst problem in the world, which 
sounds crazy. Where does the seeming craziness of that con-
clusion come from?
V: Let’s review the major premises in my reasoning. Some 
of them are moral, and some are empirical, factual premises. 
First, I have the moral premise that suffering is bad. Anything 
surprising there?
M: No, that seems obvious enough. But I think it’s surprising 
that animal suffering matters just as much as human suffering.
V: But I don’t need to assume that. I can just say that animal 
suffering is at least one one-thousandth as bad as qualitatively 
similar human suffering. That’s enough for my argument. Is 
that surprising?
M: I’m surprised that an animal welfare nut would admit that 
humans might matter a thousand times more than animals.
V: Right, that’s surprising. But it’s not surprising that animal 
welfare matters at least one thousandth as much as human wel-
fare, is it?
M: Not particularly.
V: The next step in my argument is just a factual, empirical 
premise: that life on factory farms is extremely unpleasant. Is 
that surprising?
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M: You know, after we talked last time, I watched one of those 
PETA videos, “Meet Your Meat,” about conditions on factory 
farms.39 I had no idea how cruel they were.
V: So that part is surprising.
M: I guess so.
V: Here’s my other factual premise: the number of animals 
killed in two years of factory farming is greater than the total 
number of humans who have ever existed. Were you expecting 
that?
M: Okay, that’s surprising. I was kind of shocked to hear that.
V: That’s where the “craziness” comes from. My moral claims 
aren’t surprising; it’s the empirical facts that are surprising. 
It’s shocking that factory farming might be the world’s worst 
problem, not because it’s shocking that animal suffering might 
matter, but because the quantity of animal suffering is shock-
ingly large.
M: So if I find your conclusion incredible, I should question the 
empirical claims about the quantity of suffering.
V: Do you think that would be the rational thing to do?
M: Somehow, it doesn’t seem rational. I’m not sure why, though. 
V: You can’t use a moral assessment of some case to figure 
out what the empirical facts of the case are. That’s because a 
39  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, “Meet your Meat” (vid-
eo), Nov. 22, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32IDVdgmzKA.
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moral assessment isn’t reliable unless it is based on indepen-
dently-known empirical facts to begin with. For instance, your 
moral assessment of meat-eating isn’t reliable unless it takes 
into account the empirical facts about the effects of meat-eat-
ing. Therefore, you can’t figure out what those empirical facts 
are based on your initial sense that meat-eating isn’t extremely 
wrong.
M: I see. But then maybe I should deny one of your moral 
premises.
V: I don’t think that would make sense either. That’s why I 
made the point about how the surprisingness of my conclu-
sions is due to the empirical facts, not my moral premises. You 
generally shouldn’t reject an obvious moral principle based on 
a moral assessment of a particular case that didn’t take the em-
pirical facts into account.
M: That’s a bit abstract for me.
V: Here’s an illustration. Let’s say you’re initially extremely 
confident that Alice is a good person. You also believe that a 
good person wouldn’t murder someone for money. Now sup-
pose you learn, to your great surprise, that Alice has murdered 
someone for money. There’s compelling video evidence, and 
so on. What should you conclude: (a) that Alice isn’t a good 
person after all, or (b) that murdering for money is consistent 
with being good?
M: Obviously (a).
V: Good. That’s like our case. You’re initially convinced that 
meat-eating is okay, or at least not awful. You also believe that 
causing enormous suffering for trivial reasons is awful. Then 
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you learn that meat-eating causes enormous suffering for triv-
ial reasons. What should you conclude: (a) that meat-eating is 
awful, or (b) that causing enormous suffering for trivial rea-
sons isn’t awful?
M: I see your analogy. But why does your conclusion still sound 
hard to believe to me?
V: I can think of several plausible explanations for that. 
M: Start with the biggest one.
V: Okay. Number one: status quo bias.
M: What’s that?
V: It’s a bias in favor of the current practices of your own so-
ciety. We often form moral beliefs by looking at how other 
people behave, and the reactions of others to that behavior, and 
assuming the common behavior and reactions are appropriate. 
That’s why people from different cultures with radically differ-
ent practices tend to all think that their own culture is the best. 
And why a proposal to radically alter the practices may strike 
us as “crazy.”
M: Well, maybe this tendency is a good thing. It’s how we pre-
serve our culture and traditions.
V: Perhaps it’s a good thing in most cases. It stops you from 
stealing, driving on the wrong side of the street, and so on. But 
it can also lead to mass atrocities. In the nineteenth century 
and earlier, it led many people to accept slavery, to treat slave 
masters with respect and runaway slaves as criminals.
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M: So you think factory farming is like the slavery of our day.
V: I do. Our society has always had flaws and moral blind 
spots, which later generations look back and shake their heads 
at. Slavery was one of them. It would be surprising, wouldn’t 
it, if today was the first time in history when there weren’t any 
major moral flaws in our society?
M: Sure, I guess. But that doesn’t mean that factory farming is 
one of those flaws.
V: That’s what we’re trying to figure out. But on the face of 
it, the movement for animal welfare seems to fit the pattern 
of past moral progress. Much of the progress of the past was 
about overcoming prejudices against non-dominant groups – 
prejudice based on race, based on sex, based on religion, based 
on disability.40
M: And then prejudice based on species?
V: That’s the next one.
M: But that’s different. Sex and race differences are obviously 
morally irrelevant. But species differences are obviously rel-
evant.41
V: Two centuries ago, people would have said sex and race dif-
ferences are obviously morally relevant. Then, the abolition-
ists and the advocates for women’s suffrage were the “crazy 
extremists.”
40  See Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2011).
41  M again follows Richard Posner’s views from his debate with Singer.
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M: When I introspect, it doesn’t seem to me that I’m just ac-
cepting meat-eating because other people are doing it.
V: People are often mistaken about what accounts for their own 
intuitions or beliefs. We’re unaware of a lot of the things that 
influence how things seem to us. But status quo bias is ex-
tremely widespread and well established, so you are probably 
subject to it too.
M: But there are other cases in which I criticize the status quo. 
For instance, I oppose the current President and many of his 
policies.
V: True, but meat-eating is something you actually see done in 
front of you on a daily basis, by almost everyone. Government 
policies are just things that you hear about on the news.
M: So the status quo bias mostly applies to actions that you 
observe in your day-to-day life?
V: I think so. Also, your political views have more “social 
proof.”42
M: What do you mean, “social proof”?
V: It’s similar to status quo bias. People have a bias toward 
believing what other people believe – or at least things that are 
close to what a good number of their peers believe. A view that 
is too far out of the mainstream of opinion will tend to strike 
us as “crazy.”
42  See Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New 
York: William Morrow & Co., 1993), ch. 4.
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M: Well, you’re definitely out of the mainstream. I note that 
this explanation only works if there are already other reasons 
why your view is unpopular; then this factor might contribute 
to making it even less popular.
V: Right. Another influence is self-interest. People tend to be 
biased in favor of beliefs that serve their own interests. For 
example, people in the slavery era who owned slaves had an 
interest in believing that slavery was okay. Otherwise, they’d 
have to give them up, at great financial cost. Plus, they’d have 
to believe unflattering things about themselves.
M: Well, of course it’s in my interests to keep eating meat, and 
I’d prefer to think that it was okay while I’m doing it. But it 
doesn’t seem to me that I’m being influenced by that.
V: It probably wouldn’t. Most people who are influenced by a 
bias can’t themselves detect the bias. You have this sense that 
my conclusion is “crazy,” and you don’t know why it seems that 
way. So the seeming is probably caused by some unconscious 
factors like these.
M: I see. Is that all?
V: Not yet. Another factor is something called the “affect 
heuristic.”43 It’s the tendency to evaluate how good or bad 
43  For discussion of the affect heuristic as used in decision-making, see 
Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor, 
“The Affect Heuristic” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intui-
tive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 397-420. On the ap-
plication of the affect heuristic to moral philosophy, see Michael Huemer, 
“Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics,” Ethics 123 
(2013): 318-45, at pp. 328-30.
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something is by reference to the strength of the emotional reac-
tion we feel when we contemplate the thing.
M: That doesn’t sound so wrong. Usually, the worse something 
is, the worse I feel about it; the better it is, the better I feel.
V: Usually, yes. But there are at least two reasons why we might 
go astray in the case of animal ethics. One is that our capacity 
for empathy with other species is limited. We find it harder to 
empathize with other species than with other humans. So we 
have diminished affective reactions when we think about ani-
mal suffering, compared to human suffering.
M: Okay, but maybe the explanation goes the other way: maybe 
I have diminished empathic responses to animal suffering be-
cause I know that animal suffering is less important than hu-
man suffering.
V: I think that’s unlikely; I have a better explanation: human 
beings evolved as social animals. The capacity for empathy 
probably evolved to enable us to get along better with other 
humans in our social group, not to get along with other species. 
That’s why we don’t empathize as readily with other species.
M: That sounds speculative.
V: True. I’m just trying to offer plausible explanations for your 
intuitive reactions.
M: Okay. What’s the other problem with the affect heuristic?
V: We have a well-known problem dealing with large quanti-
ties. We can’t intuitively grasp them. Moreover, as we imagine 
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larger quantities of something that’s good or bad, our affective 
response doesn’t increase proportionately. 
M: I suppose that’s a good thing. Otherwise, we’d be in con-
stant emotional agony from listening to the news.
V: Right. If you hear about a disaster that killed five people, 
you feel sorry about that. If you hear about one that killed five 
thousand people, you don’t feel a thousand times as sorry.
M: Do we just feel the maximum degree of sorriness then?
V: Not even that. If there is a maximum intensity of negative 
emotion, we don’t necessarily feel it even in response to colos-
sal evils. A vivid description of one death, by a sympathetic 
person, might make us feel worse than a report of a million 
deaths. Many factors affect our emotional response. It clearly 
isn’t simply proportional to the size of the good or bad event – 
not even close.
M: So then this leads us astray when we try to assess the bad-
ness of large evils.
V: Yeah, like when we talk about something happening to bil-
lions of creatures. Our minds can’t really appreciate, or respond 
proportionately, to such quantities. Harming a billion creatures 
is a thousand times worse than harming a million creatures – 
but we don’t feel that way.
M: But this doesn’t seem to lead us astray much when we are 
thinking about human harms. If I ask someone, “How much 
worse is it to kill a billion people than to kill one person?”, I 
bet most people would get the correct answer: one billion times 
worse.
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V: Probably. But that’s because they don’t have to rely on an 
independent moral intuition to make the comparison – they just 
look at the numbers. It’s when you compare bads belonging to 
different categories that you deploy the affect heuristic.
M: Different categories? So like, if I’m asked to compare a bro-
ken promise to a sprained ankle?
V: Right. Or animal suffering to human suffering.
M: But according to you animal advocates, those are in the 
same category.
V: But most people think of them as belonging to different cat-
egories. Most people think you have to deploy an independent 
moral intuition to compare animal and human harms. So they 
do – and that intuition is affect-driven.
M: So you’re against relying on affect in moral evaluation?
V: Not necessarily, not across the board. It’s just that in some 
cases we can predict that it would be unreliable.
M: But in order to say that the affect heuristic is unreliable 
in this case, don’t you have to already know what the correct 
moral judgment is? If it’s leading us away from the truth, it’s 
unreliable; but if it’s giving us the correct answer, then it’s reli-
able.
V: No, when I say it’s unreliable, what I mean is this: we 
shouldn’t have any independent expectation that it would get 
us the truth. The affect heuristic would lead us to judge human 
interests more important than animal interests, whether or not 
that was true. So, if you start out with no opinion about whether 
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human interests matter more, you can’t trust your emotional 
responses to tell you the answer.
M: Okay, so couldn’t the large-numbers problem be avoided 
by just asking people to think about individual cases? Like, 
imagine a single cow suffering on a factory farm for a day, then 
imagine a single person enjoying the pleasure of a hamburger. 
We should be able to compare those two, right?
V: You’re right, that would avoid the large-numbers problem, 
though it’s still subject to the other biases I mentioned.
M: Well, when I think about the cow on the factory farm, it 
doesn’t seem very bad to me.
V: Really? When I think about it, it seems very bad to me – 
clearly much worse than someone being deprived of the plea-
sure of a hamburger.
M: I guess we have a basic clash of intuitions. I wonder why we 
have such different reactions.
V: People vary in their capacity for empathizing with other 
species. 
M: That’s true, I find it pretty hard to empathize with a cow. 
But why should I trust your intuitions, rather than my own?
V: Remember all the biases we were just talking about?
M: Sure. But your intuitions are also biased.
V: How do you figure that?
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M: You just admitted it: you empathize with nonhuman ani-
mals. That’s biasing your moral judgment.44
V: I said that was explaining the difference in our reactions. I 
didn’t say it was a bias on my part.
M: You don’t think empathy can function as a bias?
V: I don’t see any reason to think it’s a bias in this case. Com-
pare another case: the case of psychopaths. Psychopaths lack 
the capacity for empathy in general. Does that mean that they 
make the most objective, unbiased moral judgments?
M: I’m not sure they make moral judgments at all.45
V: Right, their lack of empathy prevents them from taking oth-
ers’ experiences into account. It doesn’t make them objective; 
it makes them ethically blind.46
M: Okay, obviously a complete lack of empathy is a problem. 
But too much empathy can also be a problem. I know some-
one who has too much empathy, and it messes up her life. She 
winds up feeling anguish a lot of the time because of other 
people’s problems. She’s even gone into serious debt trying to 
help others.
44  On the biasing effects of empathy, see Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: 
The Case for Rational Compassion (New York: Ecco, 2016).
45  For discussion, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Do Psychopaths Re-
fute Internalism?” in Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, ed. 
Thomas Schramme (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), pp. 187-207.
46  Iskra Fileva (“Reflection Without Empathy,” ms.) argues that psycho-
paths are unable to reason morally due to their incapacity for affective em-
pathy.
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V: Yeah, that sounds like a practical problem. But I’m not sure 
it’s relevant to the point here.
M: Why not? You were talking about how important empathy 
is.
V: Yeah, but I’m not saying empathy is good in all ways and 
in all contexts. Of course, it’s not necessarily good from the 
standpoint of self-interest. What I’m saying is that empathy 
helps us to perceive morally relevant factors that depend on 
the interests of others; without it, we just care about our own 
interests. So your overly empathic friend is doing poorly with 
respect to promoting her own interests, but she’s probably do-
ing quite well with respect to appreciating the moral relevance 
of others’ interests.
M: Point taken. But too much empathy can also lead to moral 
errors. For instance, we might give money to charities that help 
people in a visible way – like those ones where you sponsor a 
child and they send you pictures of the child and stuff – instead 
of giving to charities that don’t send you pictures but that are 
actually more cost effective. That’s because of empathy.
V: Yeah, that’s true too. So empathy isn’t sufficient for making 
good moral choices. But it might be necessary. You need it in 
order to be moved to take account of interests other than your 
own. You still need to use reason to decide what to do about 
those other interests. But if you lack the capacity for empathy, 
you’ll just ignore others’ interests. Like how psychopaths just 
ignore other people’s interests, and factory farm workers just 
ignore the interests of animals.
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M: But I don’t lack the capacity for empathy; I just have more 
trouble empathizing with other species than with my own – 
which is perfectly normal.
V: That’s normal, true. But it’s also true that it prevents you 
from fully taking other creatures’ experiences into account. 
That doesn’t make you more objective; it makes you less aware.
M: Well, you’ve made some interesting points that I’ll have to 
think about, V. But I’m not yet convinced. Maybe your argu-
ments are pieces of sophistry that I’m just not clever enough to 
see through.
V: The G.E. Moore shift again? I thought we already discussed 
why that isn’t a rational response.
M: I know, but maybe the arguments you gave to show why 
that isn’t a rational response were themselves just pieces of 
clever sophistry.
V: If you’re going to say stuff like that, there’s no way I could 
ever convince you. Whatever I say, you can always say that 
maybe I’m wrong for some reason you can’t identify. That’s 
called being dogmatic.
M: No, I’m not being dogmatic. I’m not saying you’re definitely 
wrong. I’m just saying I’m not fully convinced. And I’m not 
saying I’ll never be convinced; I just need to think about it 
more.
V: Okay, so for now, you’re not sure whether it’s wrong to eat 
meat. Do you think it might be obligatory to eat meat?
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M: Don’t be silly. I just mean that I think it might be morally 
okay.
V: Alright, it might be wrong, or it might be just okay. In that 
case, I would suggest that, until you figure out which it is, may-
be you should stop doing it. If there’s even a fair chance that it’s 
extremely wrong, better stop until you’re more sure. You want 
to be on the safe side, right?
M: In general, yeah. But I can’t avoid every action that might be 
wrong. I mean there’s some chance that just about anything I do 
might be wrong. But I can’t be avoiding everything.
V: Fair enough. I’m not asking you to avoid every action that 
merely has some nonzero probability of being wrong. I’m say-
ing: avoid an action if it has a pretty good chance of being very 
wrong, where you have no moral reasons to do it, and where 
you can avoid it without unreasonable personal cost.
M: Well, that’s hard to object to. But until I’ve finished think-
ing through all the arguments, I’m not sure if I should even say 
there’s a “pretty good chance” that you’re right.
V: I think you know enough to say there’s at least a pretty good 
chance. You know that the issue turns on a moral intuition 
about the badness of animal suffering. This intuition is held 
by many people who appear to be in general reasonable, smart, 
and morally sensitive.
M: I guess that’s fair to say.
V: In fact, many of them consider the intuition extremely obvi-
ous. The great majority of the literature in ethics on the topic 
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also agrees that meat-eating in our society is generally wrong. 
Many of these experts consider the case decisive.47
M: But most people in our society seem to think eating meat is 
fine. And even most philosophers seem to be okay with it.
V: Right, so there’s a divergence between ethicists who work 
on the topic, and lay people or philosophers who work in other 
areas. Now all of this that I just said – this is all stuff that you 
can know, independently of your direct evaluation of the argu-
ments. I mean, you don’t have to first figure out what you think 
of the arguments, to know that most ethicists who work on the 
topic think meat-eating is wrong.
M: Okay, but we shouldn’t just defer to the experts on a contro-
versial topic like this.
V: Yeah, I’m not saying we should just defer to the experts. 
I’m saying that the opinion of these experts, together with the 
prima facie plausibility of the arguments we’ve been discuss-
ing, is enough for you to say that there’s at least a pretty good 
chance that I’m right – at least unless and until you can come 
up with a good argument against my views.
M: Maybe you’re right. But going vegetarian is going to make 
my life so much worse. I can’t commit to such a big lifestyle 
change.
V: How about you try being vegetarian just for the next week, 
and then we’ll talk about it here at the same time next week?
47  See Rachels, “Vegetarianism,” pp. 884, 898.
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M: (sigh) Oh, alright. I hope you appreciate the big sacrifice I’m 
making for you, V.
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Day 4: The vegan life, abstract theory, and moral 
motivation
Setting: Same place.
V: Hi, M. How have you been? Have you tried out the vegetar-
ian life?
M: I tried it for the last week, like you insisted.
V: Well, how did it go?
M: Oh, it was miserable! You know how much I like food. Life 
is barely worth living without fried chicken!
V: Sorry, it’s partly my fault. I could have left you with some 
advice on how to find yummy plant-based meals.
M: Are there any such things? I can’t keep eating piles of broc-
coli and lettuce.
V: Of course there are. You seem to like the meals here well 
enough.
M: Okay, that’s true, this restaurant is pretty good.
V: Most vegetarian restaurants are. They seem to put more 
thought into it than the average conventional restaurant.
M: Yeah, but I can’t afford to keep eating out.
V: That’s understandable. Fortunately, you can eat at home for 
a lot less if you go vegetarian, since vegetables are cheaper than 
meat. You know, I have a great carrot ginger soup that I make 
at home. I’ll send you the recipe.
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M: Okay, but I can’t be relying on you for advice every time I 
want to cook a meal. Plus, I’m busy; I can’t spend a whole lot 
of time on cooking.
V: Just type “easy vegan meals” into a search engine any time 
you want a new idea. You’ll get plenty of great suggestions.
M: Wait, wait. Did you say vegan? I thought I just had to give 
up meat. You mean I have to give up eggs and dairy too?
V: They come from factory farms too. If you buy them, you’re 
paying people to do factory farming.
M: But I love cheese!
V: You can get vegan cheese.
M: Vegan cheese? What the heck is that?
V: It’s a product that looks and tastes like cheese, but with no 
animal products. Usually made from cashews.
M: I’m skeptical.
V: You remember the cheese we had at the reception on Friday 
after the Philosophy colloquium?
M: I remember. That stuff was good. You see, that’s why I can’t 
give up dairy.
V: That was vegan cheese.
M: Really? Are they all that good?
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V: Some are better than others. Just find the ones you like. 
There are vegan substitutes for most animal products.
M: But where am I going to get enough protein in my diet?
V: Beans, nuts. Also, bivalves.
M: What’s a bivalve?
V: You know, clams, mussels, scallops.
M: Wait a minute. You eat clams? Clams are animals! You’re 
no vegan. You’re not even a vegetarian!
V: Bivalves have no brains.
M: So what? They’re still alive, and people have to murder 
them to satisfy your appetite. You’re no better than me with my 
chicken and hamburgers!
V: I don’t think you understood any of the preceding argu-
ments. None of the arguments were about life. After all, plants 
are alive too. So are bacteria; so are cancer cells.
M: So you don’t think that life has intrinsic value?
V: I’m not making any claims about that. My argument was 
simply that it’s wrong to inflict severe pain and suffering for 
no good reason.
M: So why do you think it’s okay to inflict pain on plants and 
clams, you evil oppressor?
V: Um, I don’t think that. What I think is that it’s impossible to 
inflict pain on plants or clams.
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M: How do you know that?
V: Pain is caused by electrical impulses from nerve endings 
reaching your brain. If the impulses don’t reach your brain, you 
don’t feel any pain. That’s known empirically. So if you didn’t 
even have a brain, then you couldn’t feel pain at all.
M: Sure, that may be the current scientific understanding. But 
you can’t be 100% certain of that. Maybe there’s some other 
way to have pain, and plants and clams are having pain all the 
time.
V: And maybe the chair you’re sitting on is in great agony. No 
way to prove it isn’t. But we have no reason to think so, and we 
have to sit somewhere.
M: Okay, I don’t really think plants are conscious. I was kid-
ding with you. But I don’t see why someone couldn’t make an 
argument similar to your earlier argument from risk, to show 
that we can’t eat plants.
V: How would that argument go?
M: You know, we’re killing so many plants every year that if 
there’s even a 1% chance that plants feel pain when they’re 
killed, we have to stop the practice.
V: And the person making this argument would be saying that 
we should not eat anything?
M: Maybe – maybe we’re ethically obligated to commit suicide.
V: Okay. Then here’s how that argument would be different 
from my argument. Number one, that argument is asking us to 
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sacrifice our lives. My argument is only asking you to give up 
a little pleasure at meal times. And that’s because I think it’s 
wrong to inflict suffering for no good reason.
M: So it’s okay to hurt others in order to survive, but not to get 
more pleasure for yourself?
V: In general, it’s much more likely to be okay. Now, here’s 
the second difference. It is virtually certain that animals feel 
pain. That’s clearly over 99% probable. But it is also virtually 
certain that plants don’t. Since plants have no nervous systems, 
the probability that they feel pain is very much lower than 1%.
M: Okay, but you’ve been misusing that word “vegetarian.” 
“Vegetarian” means a person who eats only plants. Clams and 
oysters aren’t plants.
V: I don’t care what word you use. You can call it schmegetari-
anism, compassionate eating, or whatever you want.48 As long 
as you stop patronizing animal cruelty.
M: Alright, but what about insects? Plant farming kills trillions 
of insects every year, mostly with pesticides. Surely we’re go-
ing to have to stop killing bugs, right?
V: Shouldn’t I make the same points here? One, the costs of 
giving up killing insects are much higher than the costs of giv-
ing up meat-eating. Two, it’s much less likely that insects feel 
pain. Plus: number three, we aren’t raising insects in horrible 
conditions for their whole lives before killing them, as in facto-
ry farming. And four, animal farming requires killing insects, 
48  The technical term is “ostroveganism.”
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as well as plants, in addition to the animals directly killed for 
meat. So plant farming is still better.
M: Wait, how does animal farming kill insects and plants?
V: To raise an animal, you have to feed it vegetable foods, 
which come from farms. The amount of food you then get out 
of the animal is less than the amount of food that went into 
raising it. So any problem with plant farming is also a problem 
with animal farming – in addition to all the problems with ani-
mal farms that we’ve already discussed.
M: What do you mean about the costs of giving up killing in-
sects being much higher?
V: Virtually all of modern life kills insects. You can’t drive a 
car without killing some; you can barely walk without killing 
them.
M: Okay, so maybe giving up all killing would be too demand-
ing. But surely we should still give up, say, using pesticides on 
farms, right? Because we could buy organic foods instead.
V: If you want to argue for that, go ahead. But I think you’re 
changing the subject. Let’s first agree to give up buying facto-
ry-farmed meat. Then we can worry about more controversial 
cases after that.
M: But I’ve seen you eating conventionally-raised vegetables! 
Right there! (points at V’s lunch) I bet some of those vegetables 
are conventional!
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V: Now you’re resorting to argument ad hominem. You’re ac-
cusing me of being bad or hypocritical or something, instead of 
just focusing on the arguments.
M: Shouldn’t I expect the proponents of a theory to be consis-
tent?
V: Whether or not I personally act in the morally best way is 
irrelevant to the truth of the moral principles we’ve been dis-
cussing. Even if I’m hypocritical as you claim, that certainly 
wouldn’t make it okay for you to keep buying meat. It’s just a 
way to distract yourself from the moral issue about your own 
behavior.
M: But I don’t think it’s irrelevant, because I think your failure 
to care about insects shows that you don’t really believe the 
moral views you’ve been advancing.49
V: If I don’t believe them, then why have I been eating vegan 
for the last three years? And why have I been telling you all 
these arguments? Am I just a crazy liar?
M: Okay, you believe them on one level. But on another level, 
you don’t completely believe them, because you haven’t fully 
integrated them into your thinking and your lifestyle. If you 
really, fully believed that species membership doesn’t matter, 
then you’d care more about insects.
V: So you think I’m an unconscious speciesist?
M: That’s a good way to put it.
49  Cf. Bryan Caplan, “Bugs,” Econlog, October 3, 2016, http://econlog.
econlib.org/archives/2016/10/bugs.html.
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V: Maybe. There are also experiments that suggest that most 
of us are unconscious racists.50 But that doesn’t show that these 
attitudes are correct or morally okay.
M: No, it doesn’t show that. But one explanation for why you 
haven’t rooted out all your speciesist prejudices is that they’re 
actually correct.
V: I guess that’s a possible explanation. But you’d have to think 
that unconscious biases are more reliable than conclusions of 
conscious reasoning. And we talked last time about the reasons 
why this bias is unreliable.
M: Alright, maybe your behavior doesn’t give us a good reason 
for rejecting your philosophical arguments. But I still want to 
know: should we be a lot more careful about protecting insects?
V: If insects were sentient like cows, then I’d say sure.
M: Why don’t you think insects are sentient? They’ve got eyes 
and other sense organs, so they must have sensations.
V: Three reasons. One, they don’t have nociceptors –
M: What? “Nociceptors”?
V: The kind of nerve cells that sense pain, in other animals. 
They don’t have ’em. Second, they have drastically simpler 
central nervous systems. Like a million times simpler.
50  Here, V alludes to the literature on implicit bias; see Anthony G. Gre-
enwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, “Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes,” Psychological Review 102 (1995): 4-27.
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M: Maybe you only need a simple nervous system to have pain.
V: But you’re going to have a hard time explaining the third 
point: insects don’t show normal pain behavior. An insect with 
a crushed leg keeps applying the same force to that leg. Insects 
will keep eating, mating, or whatever they’re doing, even when 
badly injured – even while another creature is eating them.51
M: Okay, so there’s a pretty good case that they don’t feel pain. 
But there’s still some chance of it, right?
V: I think you’re engaging in distraction again. If you want to 
become a bug activist, go ahead. But first, let’s agree to give 
up the much more clearly wrong practice of buying meat from 
factory farms.
M: Alright, maybe I should give up factory farm meat. What if 
I just buy free range meat instead?
V: Unfortunately, companies can legally call their products 
“free range” and still have a lot of cruelty. If you want humane-
ly-made products, you have to look for things that are certified 
51  See C.H. Eisemann, W.K. Jorgensen, D.J. Merritt, M.J. Rice, B.W. 
Cribb, P.D. Webb, and M.P. Zalucki, “Do Insects Feel Pain? – A Biological 
View,” Experientia 40 (1984): 164-7.
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by an animal welfare organization. For example, you can look 
for the “Certified Humane” logo.52
M: Then it’ll be ethical to buy it?
V: Then it might be ethical. Buying from factory farms is clear-
ly wrong; buying humane certified meat might be acceptable. 
Depends on whether you believe in animal rights or not.53
M: Well, how come we haven’t been talking about that?
V: I focus on factory farming because it’s the source of nearly 
all animal products. I figure I should first try to dissuade people 
from doing the clearly terrible thing that almost everyone is 
doing every day (buying from factory farms), before worry-
ing about something that a tiny minority of people are doing 
that’s much less bad but might still be unethical (buying from 
humane farms).
M: I see. But do you buy Humane Certified meat?
V: I don’t buy it because I don’t know if it is ethical. I figure that 
if I don’t know, I shouldn’t do it.54
M: Why don’t you know?
52  See http://certifiedhumane.org/.
53  For a defense of animal rights, see Tom Regan, “The Moral Basis 
of Vegetarianism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975): 181-214, 
available at http://tomregan.free.fr/Tom-Regan-The-Moral-Basis-of-
Vegetarianism-1975.pdf. For an argument that humane animal farming is 
wrong even if animals lack rights, see Jeff McMahan, “Eating Animals the 
Nice Way,” Daedalus 137.1 (Winter 2008): 66-76.
54  Here, V follows the reasoning of Rachels, “Vegetarianism,” p. 894.
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V: Well, I’d have to figure out whether it’s permissible to kill 
animals humanely for food. For that, I’d have to figure out 
whether they have a right to life. And for that, I guess I’d have 
to first figure out what’s the basis for the right to life in general.
M: Isn’t that what we have moral philosophers for?
V: Yeah, but the moral philosophers don’t agree.
M: Professor Tooley told me that the right to life is based on 
one’s conception of oneself as a subject of experience continu-
ing through time.55
V: That’s one theory. Another view is that the right to life rests 
on one’s being the subject of a life that matters to oneself. Or 
perhaps it rests on one’s having the potential for a human-like 
future. Or perhaps there aren’t any such things as rights in the 
first place.56
M: Why don’t we just figure out which theory is true?
V: Easier said than done. The leading experts can’t agree, so 
it seems unlikely that we can settle it here. If we start on that, 
we’ll just argue about that forever.
55  See Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Pub-
lic Affairs 2 (1972): 37-65.
56  For these views, see, respectively, Tom Regan, “The Moral Basis 
of Vegetarianism” and The Case for Animal Rights; Don Marquis, “Why 
Abortion Is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 183-202; and C. L. 
Sheng, “A Defense of Utilitarianism Against Rights-Theory,” Social Phi-
losophy Today 5 (1991): 269-99.
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M: Don’t be so pessimistic. Maybe we’re better at this than the 
leading experts.
V: Really? Remember that time when we started talking about 
the definition of knowledge?
M: Yeah, that was a great conversation.
V: A great conversation that went on for three hours. It only 
stopped because you had to leave.57
M: Yeah. I still want to raise more objections to your last theory 
on that . . .
V: And then there was the time we started talking about free 
will.
M: Another great conversation.
V: That went on for five and a half hours, and we never reached 
any agreement.
M: Okay, so we’re probably not going to deduce the correct 
ethical theory. But how can we know buying meat is wrong, 
without knowing the correct ethical theory?
V: Because the argument against meat rests on intuitive, very 
widely shared moral beliefs, like “it’s wrong to inflict a lot of 
suffering for no good reason” and “it’s wrong to pay people for 
57  Philosophers have debated the definition of knowledge for many 
years, with no consensus. For a review, see Robert K. Shope, The Analysis 
of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1983).
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immoral behavior.” Any reasonable ethical theory is going to 
agree with those.
M: Okay, but all of your arguments assume that there are objec-
tive moral truths, don’t they? That’s controversial.
V: Do all moral arguments assume that there are objective 
moral truths?
M: I don’t think so.
V: Then mine doesn’t either.
M: Why do you say that?
V: Because I don’t see how my argument differed from any 
ordinary moral argument. It’s up to you to tell me how I pre-
supposed objective values in a way that other moral arguments 
don’t.
M: Maybe because you’re arguing for a radical revision of our 
practices. On some theories, morality is just based on social 
practices.
V: Could that view have been used to defend slavery, back 
when that was the practice? Or the oppression of women? Ju-
dicial torture?
M: I guess it might.
V: Okay, if my argument against meat-eating is only as strong 
as the arguments against slavery were – if the only people who 
should disagree with me are people who think we had no rea-
son to give up slavery – I’m okay with that.
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M: Well, maybe slavery was wrong, even though it fit with the 
practices of the time, because it conflicted with some deeper 
values held by society.58
V: Like what?
M: Maybe there were deeper values of liberty and autonomy, 
and a consistent application of those values, without making 
arbitrary distinctions, required granting freedom to slaves.
V: In that case, I think factory farming is also wrong because 
it conflicts with deeper values of our society. Like the deeper 
values of compassion and “not inflicting needless suffering.” 
That’s just as plausible as the story about slavery.
M: I guess so. But so much seems uncertain in this area. I’m 
not sure it’s worth changing my lifestyle, when the experts 
can’t even agree on whether there are any moral facts, whether 
they’re dependent on conventions, and so on.
V: This sort of skepticism only seems to come up when people 
are criticized for behavior that they don’t want to change, and 
they run out of ways of trying to defend it. Only then do you 
start feeling skeptical about morality. The rest of the time, you 
have no trouble accepting moral judgments. 
M: What do you mean? I don’t go around judging people all 
the time!
V: Let me give you an example. Say person A is suing per-
son B, and we’re on the jury. We’re supposed to decide if B 
wronged A in a way that demands compensation.
58  Following Harman, The Nature of Morality, pp. 94-5.
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M: Isn’t the jury just supposed to decide whether B did some-
thing illegal?
V: Just assume that the law says A is entitled to compensation 
only if B wronged A.
M: Okay.
V: It turns out that what B did was to smash A’s car with a 
sledgehammer, just for fun, causing $2000 worth of damage. 
Several witnesses saw it.
M: Sounds like an easy case. A gets $2000.
V: Not so fast! There are a few philosophers in the jury room: 
a metaphysician, a political theorist, an epistemologist, and an 
ethicist. The metaphysician argues that B isn’t responsible for 
his action, because there’s no such thing as free will.
M: I guess that could make sense . . .
V: The political theorist says that B’s action wasn’t wrong be-
cause property rights are illegitimate. The epistemologist says 
that we can’t accept the eyewitnesses’ testimony until we first 
prove that the senses are reliable. Finally, the ethicist says that 
there are no moral facts, so B couldn’t have done anything 
wrong.
M: I guess this is why they don’t usually allow philosophers 
on the jury.
V: (laughs) No doubt. So how would you vote? 
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M: If I agreed with one of those philosophers, I’d have to sup-
port the defendant.
V: Right. But how would you actually vote? Would you say B 
did nothing wrong?
M: No. Personally, I’d still vote to award $2000 to A.
V: So skeptical philosophical theories don’t prevent you from 
making moral judgments about other people’s behavior.
M: No.
V: In fact, when I first told you the story, you said it sounded 
like an easy case. 
M: Yeah, it did.
V: Well, the case of ethical vegetarianism is just as easy. There’s 
no more doubt about the wrongness of meat-eating than there is 
about the wrongness of smashing someone’s car for the fun of 
it – or the wrongness of beating children, or killing people for 
money, or any other paradigm wrong. You wouldn’t go ahead 
and do those other things just because there might not be any 
moral facts, would you?
M: No. But you really think being vegetarian is a simple, clear 
decision, just like deciding not to kill people for money?
V: Basically, yes. At its heart, the question is: do I support 
something that causes enormous pain and suffering, for the 
sake of minor benefits for me? That’s it. It’s not “Are human 
lives more valuable than animal lives”? It’s not “Are there ob-
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jective values?” or “Are there rights?” or “What’s the basis for 
rights?” It’s just about causing great suffering for small gains.
M: Well, your arguments sound reasonable and all. But I just 
don’t think I can give up meat. It’s too difficult, and I am weak-
willed.
V: I don’t think that’s true.
M: I’m telling you, I’m not ready to give up meat. You think 
I’m lying?
V: I don’t think you’re lying. But people are often mistaken 
about why they make the choices they do. If you keep eating 
meat, it won’t be because it was too difficult to give it up.
M: What do you mean?
V: Imagine the next time you’re in a restaurant, and you’re 
thinking of ordering a meat dish. Imagine I show up just be-
fore you order, and I offer you $20 to order a vegetarian dish 
instead.
M: Twenty bucks? That would be like getting a free meal at 
most places, plus some extra cash.
V: Would you take it?
M: Sure.
V: So it’s not really very difficult to refrain from eating meat. 
It can’t be very hard, if just paying you $20 gets you to do it.
M: Sure, it would be easy to forego one time. But after going 
for a few weeks without it, it would get harder, as I started 
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to miss the taste. Don’t you find it a terrible struggle to stay 
vegan?
V: No, not really.
M: You must have an iron will. Day in and day out, seeing deli-
cious meat around you . . . ? What’s your secret?
V: I don’t deliberate. I don’t decide, every time I eat, whether 
to be vegan. If I had to decide every time, I imagine that would 
be a hard lifestyle. 
M: Well, why don’t you deliberate about it? I thought about it 
many times over the past week!
V: I don’t deliberate about whether to do things that are wrong. 
I decided once, three years ago, that buying meat was wrong, 
and I’ve had no reason to reopen the issue. So I don’t have to 
struggle with any decision.
M: Oh, I bet you do some wrong things from time to time. 
Come on.
V: Let me rephrase. I don’t deliberate about doing things that I 
see as terrible. Stealing paper clips, sure. Mugging people? No 
way, not even thinking about it.
M: I don’t know if it’s possible for me to get in that state of 
mind.
V: When you see an attractive person, do you have to struggle 
with the decision of whether to grope them or not?
M: I would never do that.
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V: Or when someone pisses you off, do you have to struggle 
with the decision of whether to smack their face?
M: Not that either!
V: Right. You already know that you don’t do things like that, 
so there’s no deliberation and no internal struggle.
M: I just haven’t been able to get in that state of mind with this 
issue. The past week was so hard. I’m really hankering after a 
steak now.
V: Here’s another hypothetical. You’ve gone without meat for 
three weeks, so you’re hankering after a steak. Like now, only 
more so. We’re out to lunch with Bob, and he’s got a steak on 
his plate. You know how he cuts his food up into bite-sized 
pieces? You could reach over, spear a piece with your fork, and 
eat it before he can stop you. Assume that this is the only way 
for you to get some steak. Do you do it?
M: Hm, would that be unethical, on your view? He’s already 
ordered it . . . 
V: Never mind that. I’m not asking what you should do. I’m 
asking a psychological question. Do you think you would in 
fact grab a piece of Bob’s steak?
M: I think Bob would get mad if I did that.
V: Okay, what if he’s gone for a bathroom break, so he won’t 
even see you?
M: He might notice when he gets back.
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V: He probably won’t notice one piece. Even if he does, what’s 
he going to do?
M: Well, maybe I would take one then!
V: Come on. Have you ever done something like that?
M: Okay, fine, I wouldn’t take it.
V: Why not?
M: I don’t know, people just don’t do things like that.
V: Even though you have this supposedly irresistible need for 
steak?
M: Maybe you’re just showing the power of social conventions. 
I have two powerful urges, but the urge to follow conventions 
is so strong that I can’t take the steak.
V: Okay. Let’s say you ask Bob for a piece of his steak. He of-
fers to sell it to you for $20. Nothing wrong with that, as far as 
society is concerned, right?
M: It’s pretty weird, but not exactly socially unacceptable.
V: You happen to have a twenty in your pocket. Do you hand 
it over?
M: $20 for one bite? That’s totally unreasonable. Bob can shove 
it.
V: What about your powerful, nearly irresistible steak urge?
M: One bite wouldn’t satisfy it anyway.
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V: Okay. What if he offers to sell you the whole steak for, say, 
$100?
M: Um . . . that’s a bit much.
V: Notice how this is different from, say, a drug addict. The 
drug addict would really hand over $100 to get his fix. That’s 
because they really have overpowering urges. You, however, 
do not.
M: Okay, fine. I guess it’s not all that difficult to refrain from 
eating meat. I guess it’s just that I’m a selfish bastard. Thanks 
for pointing that out.
V: I don’t think that’s it either. Here’s another hypothetical. 
You’re in the library late at night. You see a desk where an-
other student has been studying. The student has gone off to 
the bathroom and left his backpack there, with his wallet sitting 
on top. You could grab the wallet and leave, and no one would 
ever catch you. Do you take it?
M: Hey, I’m no thief!
V: Good. But a real selfish bastard would take it, right?
M: I guess so. Then what are you saying explains my choices?
V: Social conformity. Stealing is disapproved in our society, 
and you’ve internalized that. Meat-eating isn’t, and almost 
everyone around you is doing it. That’s why you keep eating 
meat, no matter how wrong it is, but you won’t steal, no matter 
how much it would be in your interests.
M: So it’s mostly peer pressure?
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V: Now you understand why I was getting all “judgy” on you 
earlier.
M: What, you’re trying to exert peer pressure on me?
V: That’s the main way morality is enforced in human societ-
ies. Others express disapproval of bad behavior, and it makes 
us want to avoid that behavior. If there’s no disapproval, then 
most of us keep acting badly. That’s why the people who know 
that a practice is wrong have to keep saying so.
M: You’re making humans sound kind of weak. Like we just do 
whatever we see other people doing, however wrong it is.
V: Pretty much. Think about cases like Nazi Germany. Ordi-
nary, average Germans, who never committed a crime before, 
found themselves helping to mass murder Jews. The natural 
resistance to killing was overcome, mainly by social pressure.
M: Yeah, Germans suck, don’t they?
V: Not just Germans. If you lived in the American South in the 
1800’s, you would probably have accepted slavery as perfectly 
natural.
M: Yeah, you talked about that before, when you were talking 
about the status quo bias. But what if you’ve already accepted 
that meat-eating is wrong, but you just can’t give it up?
V: That happened with slavery too. Thomas Jefferson was a 
big philosophical opponent of slavery, yet he was also a slave 
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master.59 If Jefferson was alive today, do you think he would 
still have slaves?
M: I assume not. Only a terrible person would hold slaves to-
day. But what are you trying to conclude from this?
V: It’s about social conformity. Jefferson “couldn’t give up” his 
slaves, not because he had some powerful urge to be a slave 
master, and not even just because it would be so much against 
his interests (though it would have), but because other people 
in his society had slaves and accepted the practice – that un-
dermined his moral motivation. If he lived today, he wouldn’t 
dream of owning other people, because it’s so uniformly disap-
proved.
M: Is all this supposed to help me give up meat?
V: Yeah. If you think that you can’t do it because you have 
these overpowering carnivorous urges, or even that you’re just 
utterly selfish, then it’s unlikely that you’ll make the effort. But 
once you realize that you make comparable sacrifices to your 
interests all the time, and it’s not that difficult, then you’re more 
likely to do it. The reason you make other sacrifices but you’re 
not making this sacrifice is a really bad reason: not enough 
other people are pressuring you.
M: You know, you vegans are really preachy and moralistic. 
I’m not sure I want to be like you.
59  For Jefferson’s views on slavery, see Christa Dierksheide, “Thomas 
Jefferson and Slavery,” The Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia, 2008, https://
www.monticello.org/site/plantation-and-slavery/thomas-jefferson-and-
slavery.
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V: Well, I hope you understand now why we are so “moralis-
tic,” as you put it.
M: Because you have a character flaw that makes you take plea-
sure in controlling other people and feeling superior to them?
V: God, no. I wish I didn’t have to do any of this. I wish the 
meat industry were ethical so I could buy their products. Or at 
least that everyone knew it was unethical so I wouldn’t have 
to keep talking about it and having tensions with other people.
M: You mean being vegetarian causes other people to get mad 
at you?
V: Not exactly. Most people respect my dietary choices as long 
as I’m quiet about it. It’s when I start talking about how they 
should stop eating meat that people get angry.
M: What do they do?
V: Sometimes they talk about how vegans are excessively mor-
alistic or self-satisfied60 – discounting the possibility that veg-
ans just sincerely care about the welfare of animals. Or they 
sarcastically pose as broccoli rights advocates. Or they start 
bragging aggressively about how much they love bacon.
M: Well, when you call people immoral, you have to expect 
them to retaliate.
60  Lomasky (“Is it Wrong to Eat Animals?”, p. 199) warns of the danger 
of “excessive self-satisfaction” for ethical vegetarians.
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V: I wouldn’t. When you meet a devout Catholic, do you start 
going on about how much you love abortion, and how you hope 
to perform a few abortions later that day?
M: Well, I’m pro-choice, but I still wouldn’t do that. That would 
be offensive.
V: Would you tell them how Catholics are just motivated by 
the desire to feel superior to others, or to tell others what to do?
M: No. I assume that Catholics motivated by their understand-
ing of God, and what God requires of us.
V: Yet many meat-eaters refuse to accept that vegans are mo-
tivated by their understanding of what morality requires of us.
M: So why do it? Why not just keep your veganism to yourself?
V: (sigh) Because that would be wrong.
M: I don’t see why. You’re not making them eat meat. It’s not 
your job to ensure other people’s morality. Like how you don’t 
have to go around making sure your neighbors aren’t cheating 
on their spouses. Each of us is only responsible for the morality 
of our own actions.
V: That might be true in general. But I think this issue is a 
special case.
M: What’s special about it?
V: First, for most of the wrongs of the past – slavery, colo-
nialism, the oppression of women – the victims could and did 
speak up. In the present case, the victims will never be able to 
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act or speak for themselves. There is no one to speak against 
what we humans are doing, except us. So we have to do it. If we 
don’t, it will never stop.
M: I don’t think I want to do that. It’s going to be really awk-
ward if every time I eat a meal with someone, I start telling 
them that they’re immoral.
V: Let me give you another analogy. Remember the My Lai 
Massacre?
M: Some kind of massacre in Asia, right?
V: Vietnam, during the war. American soldiers massacred an 
entire village full of Vietnamese civilians.61
M: That’s awful.
V: Say you’re one of the soldiers. Some of your colleagues are 
shooting villagers and dumping them in a mass grave. The vil-
lagers are all completely unarmed. They can’t even plead for 
their lives, because they don’t speak English. What do you do?
M: Well, I wouldn’t shoot the villagers.
V: In fact, some soldiers declined to participate, as you suggest. 
But that wasn’t good enough. Then the rest of the soldiers just 
went on killing.
M: Well, what would you suggest?
61  See History.com, “My Lai Massacre,” 2009, http://www.history.com/
topics/vietnam-war/my-lai-massacre.
Michael Huemer
131
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
V: There’s no one else there besides the soldiers and the villag-
ers. The villagers can’t do anything to stop the massacre. So it 
has to be on the soldiers. The ones who know that it’s wrong 
have to try to stop it.
M: But how could I stop it?
V: I don’t know. But I think, at a minimum, you should tell the 
other soldiers that they’re committing a war crime and they 
have to stop.
M: I doubt that would work. They’d probably just keep doing 
it anyway.
V: Maybe so. But you should at least try. You shouldn’t just 
stand by and watch because, “Oh, it’s going to be socially 
awkward if I point out that my buddies are committing a war 
crime.” Or because, “People are going to think I’m judgmental 
for objecting to murder.”
M: But if I make people really uncomfortable, they’re not going 
to stop eating meat; they’ll just stop talking to me.
V: Fair point. So you need to strike a balance between staying 
silent in the face of a great wrong, and alienating most other 
people. You need to make the point that meat-eating is wrong, 
but in a calm and rational manner, so you don’t sound crazy.
M: Speaking of crazy, don’t you think some of your analogies 
are a little hyperbolic? Comparing meat-eating to being a Nazi, 
or a slave-master, or massacring a village of civilians? I don’t 
claim to be a saint or anything, but I’m hardly like a Nazi just 
because I enjoy the occasional burger.
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V: Many people feel that way. That’s another reason why peo-
ple keep eating meat, even after they know that it’s wrong.
M: What, because we’re not saints?
V: Nor do we want to be. Most people have a certain tolerance 
for immorality in themselves. They don’t aspire to be ideal; 
they just want to be not too bad, morally speaking.
M: Yeah, you know, I’m only human. Like, sometimes I stretch 
the truth a bit when I’m trying to impress a date. I know it’s 
wrong, but I’m not trying to be perfect. But I make up for it by 
being very nice.
V: Yeah, this isn’t like that. The arguments we’ve been discuss-
ing don’t suggest that meat-eating is a minor foible, like lying 
to impress your date. The arguments suggest that human meat 
consumption, taken as a whole, may be literally the greatest 
problem in the world.
M: Yeah, I know. 74 billion animals and all. But any given per-
son only contributes a tiny amount of that harm.
V: True, you only contribute a tiny percentage of it. But that 
tiny percentage is still extremely harmful. If you keep eating 
meat, you’re probably going to eat over two thousand land ani-
mals in your lifetime.62
62  Geiss (“How Many Animals Do We Eat?”) estimates that Americans 
eat 2,400 land animals per lifetime, based on the annual meat consumption 
in America, the national population, and life expectancy at birth. Jonathan 
Foer estimates that an average American eats 21,000 animals (presumably 
including seafood) in a lifetime (Eating Animals, New York: Little, Brown, 
& Co., 2009, p. 121).
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M: Two thousand? I don’t believe that.
V: Well, if you eat meat at every meal, three times a day, that’s 
3 times 365 – that’s over 1,000 meat dishes a year, right?
M: Yeah . . .
V: The average American lives 79 years. So that’s over 79,000 
meat dishes in a lifetime. How many animals do you think 
would be needed to provide 79,000 meat dishes?
M: But I don’t eat meat at every meal.
V: Okay. What if you do it half the time? Then you only have 
about 40,000 meat dishes in a lifetime. It’s still plausible that 
over 2,000 animals would have to be killed to provide that.
M: I thought your argument was all about causing suffering, 
not about killing.
V: Yeah, I’m just using the numbers killed as a proxy for the 
number that are subjected to extreme suffering. Subjecting 
more than two thousand other creatures to agony would be the 
worst thing you did in your life, by far.
M: Alright, but it’s still not like being a Nazi.
V: No? Why not?
M: Well, everyone knows that killing people is wrong. Most of 
us don’t know that eating meat is wrong.
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V: The Nazis didn’t know that killing Jews was wrong either. 
Many of them thought that it was morally right. Some talked 
about steeling themselves to do their duty.63
M: Okay, but everyone should know that it’s wrong to murder 
people.
V: Everyone should also know that it’s wrong to inflict 
severe pain and suffering for trivial reasons.
M: Okay, but not everyone knows that the meat industry 
does that.
V: And most Nazis didn’t know, when they first became 
Nazis, or when they helped ship people to concentration 
camps, that Hitler was going to order everyone in the 
camps to be executed.
M: Hey, are you defending Nazis now?
V: That wasn’t what I was trying to do. Nevertheless, the 
people we think of as villains are rarely as diabolical as we 
imagine them. And those we think of as decent, including 
ourselves, are rarely as decent as we imagine them. The 
gap between the Nazi officer and the average American is 
much smaller than we think. Both are, for the most part, 
simply going along with what those around them are say-
ing and doing, without thinking too hard about what is 
63  Jonathan Bennett discusses this in “The Conscience of Huckleberry 
Finn,” Philosophy 49 (1974): 123-34, at pp. 127-9. See also Claudia Koonz, 
The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005).
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right or wrong, or trying too hard to be good or bad. One 
just happens to find himself in a society in which a geno-
cide is being carried out.
M: That’s pretty intense. I’m going to need to think more 
about all this before changing my lifestyle.
V: Fair enough. But don’t put it off for too long. “The sad 
truth is that most evil is done by people who never made 
up their minds to be either good or evil.”64
64  Here V slightly misremembers Hannah Arendt’s remark: “The sad 
truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up 
their minds to be or do either evil or good” (The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, San 
Diego: Harcourt, 1978, p. 180).
